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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, the authors give the definitions of a coprime sequence and a lever function,
and describe the five algorithms and six characteristics of a prototypal public key
cryptosystem which is used for encryption and signature, and is based on three new
problems and one existent problem: the multivariate permutation problem (MPP), the
anomalous subset product problem (ASPP), the transcendental logarithm problem (TLP),
and the polynomial root finding problem (PRFP). Prove by reduction that MPP, ASPP, and
TLP are computationally at least equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the
same prime field, andmeanwhile find some evidence which inclines people to believe that
the new problems are harder than DLP each, namely unsolvable in DLP subexponential
time. Demonstrate the correctness of the decryption and the verification, deduce the
probability of a plaintext solution being nonunique is nearly zero, and analyze the exact
securities of the cryptosystem against recovering a plaintext from a ciphertext, extracting
a private key from a public key or a signature, and forging a signature through known
signatures, public keys, and messages on the assumption that IFP, DLP, and LSSP can be
solved. Studies manifest that the running times of effectual attack tasks are greater than
or equal to O(2n) so far when n = 80, 96, 112, or 128 with lgM ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or
1216. As viewed from utility, it should be researched further how to decrease the length of
a modulus and to increase the speed of the decryption.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The trapdoor functions for RSA [1] and ElGamal [2] public key cryptosystems [3] are computationally one-way [4,5],
which indicates that there always exists one sufficiently large setting of the security dominant parameter that makes
utilization of a cryptosystem feasible and breaking of the cryptosystem infeasible in polynomial time [6]. Taking RSA based
on the integer factorization problem (IFP) as an example, when the bit-length of a RSA modulus reaches 1024, attack is
infeasible but encryption and decryption are feasible in polynomial time. Such a security is referred to as asymptotic security,
which is distinguished from exact security or concrete security. The exact security is practice-oriented, and aims at giving
more precise estimates of time complexities of attack tasks [7].
In some public key cryptosystems, trapdoor functions can prevent a related plaintext from being recovered from a
ciphertext, but cannot prevent a related private key frombeing extracted from a public key. For instance, in theMHknapsack
cryptosystem [8], the subset sum problem (SSP) which contains the trapdoor information cannot prevent a MH private key
from being extracted from ci ≡ aiW (%M) by the method of accumulating points of minima [9], and moreover, when a
related knapsack density is less than 1, the low-density SSP (LSSP) will degenerate to a polynomial time problem from a
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NPC problem owing to the L3 lattice base reduction algorithm [10,11] which is employed for finding the shortest vector or
an approximately shortest vector in a lattice [12].
Along with the elevation of a computer’s CPU speed, the security dominant parameter of a cryptosystem becomes larger
and larger. For instance, the bit-length of modulus of the ElGamal cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) is alreadyup to 1024.We think that there are currently fourmanners of decreasing the bit-lengths of security dominant
parameters and meantime increasing the one-wayness of related trapdoor functions.
The first manner is to transplant known cryptosystems to a complex algebraic system from a simple one—the elliptic
curve analogue of ElGamal referable to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for example. By now, any effectual algorithmwhich
can find out generic elliptic curve discrete logarithms in time being subexponential in the bit-length of a modulus has not
been discovered yet [13].
Theoretically, almost every existing cryptosystemmay have an elliptic curve analogue. However, not every analogue can
bring the same effect as the analogue of ElGamal—the analogue of RSA whose security still relies on the two large prime
factors [14] for example.
The secondmanner is to design cryptosystems over polynomial rings—the NTRU cryptosystem for example. The shortest
vector problem (SVP) is the security bedrock of NTRU since it is impossible to seek an NTRU secret polynomial or an NTRU
plaintext polynomial through the L3 lattice base reduction on condition that two special parameters ch and cm are fitly
selected [15].
The third manner is to construct cryptosystems based on the tame automorphism of multivariate quadratic polynomials
over a small field—the TTM scheme [16] and the TTS scheme [17] ordinarily referred to as the multivariate cryptosystems
for example.
The fourth manner is to devise cryptosystems over small prime fields through discovering or constructing new one-way
computational problems which should be harder than IFP, DLP, or LSSP in light of the found evidence. Some threads of the
fourth manner are given in this paper.
The paper has five novelties: ① Gives the definitions and properties of a coprime sequence, a lever function, and a bit
shadow; ② offers three new computational problems—the multivariate permutation problem (MPP) Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M),
the anomalous subset product problem (ASPP) G¯ ≡ni=1 Cb ii (%M), and the transcendental logarithm problem (TLP) y ≡ xx
(%M), proves that the three problems are computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field each, and finds
some evidencewhich inclines people to believe that the three problems are separately harder than DLP;③ over a prime field,
designs the five algorithms of a prototypal public key cryptosystem called REESSE1+; ④ analyzes the security of REESSE1+;
⑤ proposes and proves the double congruence theorem.
MPPwhich owns the indeterminacy assures the security of a private key and the signature algorithm. ASPP as a trapdoor
function which can resist the L3 lattice base reduction assures the security of a ciphertext. TLP protects a private key against
being extracted from a signature, and moreover it concerts with a form of the polynomial root finding problem (PRFP)
axn+ bxn−1+ cx+ d ≡ 0 (%M¯)with a ≠ 0, 1, |b| + |c| ≠ 0, and d ≠ 0 to assure the security of a signature. Provable security
by reduction is appreciable, but not sufficient, and thus the exact security of REESSE1+ should be analyzed.
It is not difficult to understand that REESSE1+ is essentially amultiproblem cryptosystem. The security of amultiproblem
cryptosystem is equivalent to the complexity ofwhat is easiest solved in all the problems. Additionally,MPP contains the four
variables almost independent, and therefore, in a broad sense, REESSE1+ may be regarded as multivariate. A multiproblem
cryptosystem must be a multivariate cryptosystem because only multiple variables can bring multiple problems.
REESSE1+ is different from REESSE1 which has a ciphertext G¯1 = ni=1 Cbii % M with Ci = AiW ℓ(i) % M [18] and an
insecure signature (U = (UQH)S % M , V = V T % M) [19], and also different from the Naccache–Stern cryptosystem which
has a ciphertext c =ni=1 vbii %M with vi = p1/si %M [20]. It will be significant in untouched areas.
We know that in a quantum computational model, IFP and DLP are already solved in polynomial time [21], and naturally,
whether MPP, ASPP, and TLP can be solved in polynomial time on a quantum computer is interesting. Besides, TLP as
a primitive problem cannot be converted into a discrete logarithm problem, which indicates that one can design other
signature schemes over a small prime field by using TLP or its variety y ≡ (gx)x (%M).
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, n ≥ 80 is the bit-length of a block or the item-length of a sequence,
the sign %means ‘modulo’, M¯ means ‘M−1’ withM prime, lg x denotes the logarithm of x to the base 2,¬ does the opposite
value of a bit, does the maximal prime allowed in coprime sequences, |x| does the absolute value of a number x, |x| does
the order of an element x %M or the size of a set x, and gcd(a, b) represents the greatest common divisor of two integers.
Without ambiguity, ‘%M ’ is usually omitted in expressions.
2. A coprime sequence, a lever function, and a bit shadow
Definition 1. If A1, . . . , An are n pairwise distinct positive integers such that ∀Ai, Aj (i ≠ j), either gcd(Ai, Aj) = 1 or
gcd(Ai, Aj) = F ≠ 1 with (Ai/F) - Ak and (Aj/F) - Ak ∀ k ≠ i, j ∈ [1, n], these integers are called a coprime sequence,
denoted by {A1, . . . , An}, and shortly {Ai}.
Notice that the elements of a coprime sequence are not necessarily pairwise coprime, but a sequence whose elements
are pairwise coprime is a coprime sequence.
S. Su, S. Lü / Theoretical Computer Science 426–427 (2012) 91–117 93
Property 1. Let {A1, . . . , An} be a coprime sequence. If randomly select m ∈ [1, n] elements from {A1, . . . , An}, and construct
a subsequence {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} also called a subset, then the subset product G =
m
i=1 Axi = Ax1 . . . Axm is uniquely determined,
namely the mapping from {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} to G is one-to-one.
Proof. By contradiction.
Presuppose that G is acquired from two different subsequences {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} and {Ay1 , . . . , Ayh}, namely
G =
m
i=1
Axi = Ax1 . . . Axm =
h
j=1
Ayj = Ay1 . . . Ayh .
Since the two subsequences are unequal, there must exist a certain element Az which does not belong to the two
subsequences at one time.
Without loss of generality, let Az ∈ {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} and Az /∈ {Ay1 , . . . , Ayh}.
By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic [14], there must exist a prime qwhich is a divisor of Az .
Firstly, assume that ∀Ai, Aj ∈ {A1, . . . , An}, gcd(Ai, Aj) = 1, namely A1, . . . , An are pairwise coprime.
Then, there does not exist a common prime divisor between any two elements, which manifests that the prime divisors
of every element do not belong to any other elements.
Thus, qmust be a divisor of
m
i=1 Axi but not a divisor of
h
j=1 Ayj, which means that the integer G has two distinct prime
factorizations, and is in direct contradiction to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic.
Secondly, assume that ∃As, At ∈ {A1, . . . , An}with gcd(As, At) ≠ 1.
According to Definition 1, ∀Ar ∈ {A1, . . . , An} with r ≠ s, t , there are
(As/gcd(As, At)) - Ar and (At/gcd(As, At)) - Ar ,
which means that both at least one divisor of As and at least one divisor of At are not contained in any other elements.
Let z = s or t , and q be a prime divisor of Az with q - Ar∀r ≠ z ∈ [1, n].
Notice that from the above assignment, we know Az ∈ {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} and Az /∈ {Ay1 , . . . , Ayh}.
Then, there are q|mi=1 Axi = G and q -hj=1 Ayj = G, which is in direct contradiction.
In sum, the mapping between G and {Ax1 , . . . , Axm} is one-to-one. 
Definition 2. Let b1 . . . bn ≠ 0 be a bit string. Then bi with i ∈ [1, n] is called a bit shadow if it is produced by such a rule: bi
equals 0 if bi = 0, 1 plus the number of successive 0-bits before bi if bi = 1, or 1 plus the number of successive 0-bits before
and after bi if bi is the rightmost 1-bit.
Fact 1. Let b1 . . . bn ≠ 0 be a bit string. Then there isni=1 bn = n.
Proof. According to Definition 2, every bit of b1 . . . bn is considered into
k
i=1 bxi , where bx1 , . . . , bxk are 1-bit shadows in
string b1 . . . bn, and there is
k
i=1 bxi = n.
On the other hand, there is
n−k
j=1 byj = 0, where by1 , . . . , byn−k are 0-bit shadows.
In total, there is
n
i=1 bn = n. 
Property 2. Let {A1, . . . , An} be a coprime sequence, and b1 . . . bn ≠ 0 be a bit string. Then the mapping from b1 . . . bn to
G =ni=1 Abii is one-to-one.
Proof. Let b1 . . . bn and b′1 . . . b′n be two different bit strings, and separately correspond to b1 . . . bn and b
′
1 . . . b
′
n. If
b1 . . . bn = b′1 . . . b′n, it is not difficult to understand b1 . . . bn = b′1 . . . b′n. So, the mapping from b1 . . . bn to b1 . . . bn is
one-to-one.
Additionally, since Abii is not equal to 1 and contains the same prime factors as those of Ai, it is known from the proof of
Property 1 that the mapping from b1 . . . bn to
n
i=1 A
bi
i is one-to-one.
Therefore, the mapping from b1 . . . bn to
n
i=1 A
bi
i is one-to-one. 
Definition 3. The secret ℓ(i) in the key transformof a public key cryptosystem is called a lever function, if it has the following
features:
① ℓ(i) is an injection from the domain {1, . . . , n} to the codomainΩ ⊂ {1, . . . , M¯};
② the mapping between i and ℓ(i) is established randomly without an analytical expression;
③ an attacker has to be faced with all the permutations of elements in Ω when extracting a related private key from a
public key;
④ the owner of a private key only need to considers the accumulative sum of elements inΩ when recovering a related
plaintext from a ciphertext.
Features ③ and ④ make it clear that if n is large enough, it is infeasible for an attacker to search all the permutations of
elements inΩ exhaustively while decryption is feasible in time being polynomial in n. Thus, the amount of calculation on
ℓ(.) at ‘a public terminal’ is large, and the amount of calculation on ℓ(.) at ‘a private terminal’ is small.
Concretely to REESSE1+, ℓ(i) in the transform Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n is on the position of an exponent.
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Property 3 (Indeterminacy of ℓ). Let δ = 1 and Ci ≡ AiW ℓ(i) (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n, where ℓ(i) ∈ Ω = {5, . . . , n + 4} and
Ai ∈ Λ = {2, . . . , }. Then ∀W ∈ [1, M¯] with ∥W∥ ≠ M¯, and ∀x, y, z ∈ [1, n] with z ≠ x, y,
① when ℓ(x)+ ℓ(y)= ℓ(z), there is ℓ(x)+ ∥W∥ + ℓ(y)+ ∥W∥ ≠ ℓ(z)+ ∥W∥(%M¯);
② when ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) ≠ ℓ(z), there always exist
Cx ≡ A′xW ′ℓ
′(x), Cy ≡ A′yW ′ℓ
′(y), and Cz ≡ A′zW ′ℓ
′(z)(%M)
such that ℓ′(x) + ℓ′(y) ≡ ℓ′(z) (%M¯) with A′z ≤ .
Proof. ① It is easy to understand that
W ℓ(x) ≡ W ℓ(x)+∥W∥, W ℓ(y) ≡ W ℓ(y)+∥W∥, and W ℓ(z) ≡ W ℓ(z)+∥W∥(%M).
Due to ∥W∥ ≠ M¯ , 2∥W∥ ≠ ∥W∥ , and ℓ(x)+ ℓ(y)= ℓ(z), it follows that ℓ(x)+ ∥W∥ + ℓ(y)+ ∥W∥ ≠ ℓ(z)+ ∥W∥ (%M¯).
However, it should be noted that when ∥W∥ = M¯ , there is ℓ(x)+ ∥W∥ + ℓ(y)+ ∥W∥ = ℓ(z)+ ∥W∥(%M¯).
② Let O¯d be an oracle on seeking a discrete logarithm from DLP.
Suppose thatW ′ ∈ [1, M¯] is a generator of (Z∗M , ·).
In light of group theories, ∀A′z ∈ {2, . . . , }, the congruence
Cz ≡ A′zW ′ℓ
′(z)(%M)
has a solution. Then, ℓ′(z)may be taken through O¯d. ∀ℓ′(x) ∈ (0, M¯), and let ℓ′(y) ≡ ℓ′(z) – ℓ′(x) (%M¯).
Further, from Cx ≡ A′xW ′ℓ′(x) (%M) and Cy ≡ A′yW ′ℓ′(y) (% M), we can obtain many distinct pairs (A′x, A′y), where A′x, A′y ∈
[1, M¯], and ℓ′(x)+ ℓ′(y) ≡ ℓ′(z) (%M¯). 
Notice that letting Ω = {5, . . . , n + 4}, namely every ℓ(i) ≥ 5 makes seeking W from W ℓ(i) ≡ A−1i Ci (%M) face an
unsolvable Galois group when Ai is guessed [22], and especially whenΩ is any subset containing n elements of {1, . . . , M¯},
Property 3 still holds.
Assume that ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z), and let G′ ≡ CxCy C−1z (%M). Then
G′ ≡ CxCyC−1z ≡ AxAyA−1z (%M),
namely
G′/M − L/Az = (AxAy)/(MAz),
where L is an positive integer.
Due toM >
n
i=1 Ai, Ai ≥ 2, and n > 3, there is
G′/M − L/Az < 1/(2n−3A2z ) < 1/(2A2z ).
By Theorem 12.19 in Section 12.3 of [23], L/Az is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of G′/M .
Property 3 illuminates that ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z) is not necessary for the above discriminant. Therefore, a continued fraction
attack on Ci ≡ AiW ℓ(i) (%M) according to the discriminant will be ineffectual as long as Λ and Ω are fitly selected [24].
However, the robustΛ andΩ will make the decryption of a ciphertext get slow. Hence, Ci ≡ AiW ℓ(i) (%M) is not an efficient
key transform.
3. Design of the REESSE1+ public key cryptosystem
In essence, REESSE1+ is a prototypal cryptosystem which is used to expound some foundational concepts, ideas, and
methods.
3.1. The key generation algorithm
This algorithm is employed by a certificate authority or the owner of a key pair.
Let p1, . . . , pn be the first n primes in the set N,Λ= {2, 3, . . . , 1201}, andΩ = {5, 7, . . . , 2n+ 3}. Assume that đ , Ð, T ,
S are four pairwise coprime integers, where đ ∈ [5, 216], T ≥ 2n, and Ð contains a prime not less than 2n.
S1: Randomly generate a coprime sequence {A1, . . . , An} with Ai ∈Λ.
S2: Find a primeM > (max1≤i≤nAi)n making (đ ÐT )|M¯ , gcd(S, M¯ )= 1, andki=1 peii |M¯ , where kmeetski=1 ei ≥ 210 and
pk ≈ 2n.
S3: PickW , δ ∈ (1, M¯ ) making gcd(δ, M¯) = 1, ∥δ∥ = đÐT , and ∥W∥ ≥ 2n−20.
S4: Compute α← δ(δn+δWn−1)T , β← δWnT , h¯ ← (W ni=1 Ai)−δS (α δ−1) %M .
S5: Randomly produce pairwise distinct ℓ(1), . . . , ℓ(n) ∈Ω .
S6: Compute Ci ← (AiW ℓ(i))δ %M for i = 1, . . . , n.
At last, regard ({Ci}, α, β) as a public key, ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , δ, Ð, đ , h¯) as a private key, and (S, T ,M) as being in common.
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Notice that if REESSE1+ is pragmatized, we suggest that the setΩ = {+/− 5,+/− 7, . . . ,+/− (2n+ 3)}, where every
sign +/− means that ‘+’ or ‘−’ is selected, and unknown to the public, which may bring more indeterminacy, and that
gcd(W , Ð )> 1, which may avoid the existence ofW−1 % Ð no matter what the value of Ð is.
At S3, to seek δ, first let δ ≡ gM¯/(đÐT ) (%M), where g is a generator by Algorithm 4.80 in Section 4.6 of [25], then test δ.
At S4, seeking a S-th root to xS ≡ c (%M) is referred to Theorem 1 in Section 3.4.
ConsideringM>(max1≤i≤nAi)n and the fact that the first nprimes in the setN can constitute a smallest coprime sequence,
we can estimate lgM ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216 when n = 80, 96, 112, or 128.
Definition 4. Let {C1, . . . , Cn} be a non-coprime sequence, and M be a prime. Seeking the original {A1, . . . , An} with Ai ∈
Λ , {ℓ(1), . . . , ℓ(n)} with ℓ(i) ∈Ω , W , δ from Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n is called the multivariate permutation
problem, shortly MPP.
3.2. The encryption algorithm
Assume that ({Ci}, α, β) is a public key, and b1 . . . bn ≠ 0 is a plaintext block or a symmetric key.
S1: Set G¯← 1, k ← 0, i ← 1.
S2: If bi = 0, let k ← k+ 1, bi ← 0;
else do bi ← k+ 1, k ← 0, G¯← G¯ Cbii %M .
S3: Let i ← i+ 1.
If i ≤ n, go to S2.
S4: If bn = 0, do bn−k ← bn−k + k, G¯← b (Cn−k)k %M .
So, the ciphertext G¯ ≡ni=1 C G¯ii (%M) is obtained.
Notice that α and β are not useful for the encryption.
Definition 5. Let {C1, . . . , Cn} be a non-coprime sequence, andM be a prime. Seeking the original b1 . . . bn from G¯1 ≡ni=1
Cbii (%M) is called the (modular) subset product problem, shortly SPP.
Definition 6. Let {C1, . . . , Cn} be a non-coprime sequence, andM be a prime. Seeking the original b1 . . . bn, namely b1 . . . bn
from G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) is called the anomalous subset product problem, shortly ASPP.
3.3. The decryption algorithm
Assume that ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , δ,Ð, đ , h¯) is a related private key, and G¯ is a ciphertext.
Notice that because
n
i=1 bi = n is even,
n
i=1 biiℓ(i)must be even.
S1: Compute G¯← G¯δ−1 %M .
S2: Compute G¯← G¯W−2 %M .
S3: Set b1 . . . bn ← 0, G ← G¯, i ← 1, k ← 0.
S4: If Ak+1i |G, do G ← G/Ak+1i , bi ← 1, k ← 0;
else let k ← k+ 1.
S5: Let i ← i+ 1.
If i ≤ n and G ≠ 1, go to S4.
S6: If k ≠ 0 and (An−k)k|G, do G ← G/(An−k)k.
S7: If G ≠ 1, go to S2; else end.
So, the original plaintext block or symmetric key b1 . . . bn is recovered.
Only if G¯ is a true ciphertext, can this algorithm terminate normally. In decryption, {ℓ(i)}, Ð, đ , and h¯ are unhelpful.
3.4. The digital signature algorithm
Assume that ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W , δ, Ð, đ , h¯) is a private key, F is a file or message to be signed, and hash is a one-way
compression function.
S1: Let H ← hash(F), whose binary form is b1 . . . bn.
S2: Set k← δni=1 bi ℓ(i) %M¯ , G0 ← (ni=1 A¬bii )δ %M .
S3: ∀a¯ ∈ (1, M¯ ) making (đT ) - a¯ and đ - (WQ ) % M¯ ,
where Q = (a¯Ð +WH)δ−1 % M¯ .
S4: Compute R ← (Q (δ h¯)−1)S−1G−10 , U¯ ← (RW k−δ)Q %M ,
g¯← δa¯Ð %M , ξ ←n−1i=0 (δ Q )n−1−i(HW )i % M¯ .
S5: ∀r ∈ [1, đ 216] making đ - (rUS + ξ ) % M¯ ,
where U = U¯ g¯r %M .
S6: If đ - ((WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS) % M¯ , go to S5; else end.
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So, a signature (Q , U) on the file F is obtained, and sent to a receiver together with F .
It is known from S3, S4 that Q , Rmeet a¯Ð ≡ δQ −WH (% M¯) and Q ≡ (RG0)Sδh¯ (%M).
It should be noted that owing to đ - a¯, gcd(Ð, đ ) = 1, and đ |M¯ , there must exist đ - (δQ −WH).
According to the double congruence theorem (see Section 3.6), in the signature algorithm we do not need V =
(R−1W δ G1)QUδλ %M , where G1 = (ni=1 Abii )δ %M , and λ satisfies
λS ≡ ((WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS)(δQ − HW )(%M¯),
which indicates (đÐ)| λ.
At S5, the probability of finding a fit U is roughly 1/đ . Because đ is a small number, U can be found out at a good pace.
The small đ , however, does not influence the security of REESSE1+ (see Section 6.3).
Let∆≡ (WQ )n–1 + ξ + rUS (%M¯ ).
Due to đ |M¯ , if (WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS contains the factor đ , it must be contained in∆ % M¯ .
Besides, due to đ - S and đ - (WQ )n−1 (according to đ - (WQ )), if we want to make đ | ∆, there must be đ - (rUS + ξ )
% M¯ .
Therefore, as long as every value of r makes rUS different, đ | ∆ will hold after about đ attempts of r . The algorithm can
also terminate normally because after r traverses the interval [1, đ 216], the probability of đ -∆ is (1−1/đ )đ 216 , and almost
zero.
At S4, we derive ξ from ξ (δQ− WH) ≡ (δQ )n− (WH)n (%M¯ ). Computing R by Q ≡ (RG0)Sδh¯ (%M) may resort to
Theorem 1, where S meets gcd(S, M¯)= 1.
Theorem 1. For the congruence xk ≡ c (%M)withM prime, if gcd(k, M¯) = 1, every c has just one k-th rootmodulo M¯. Especially,
let µ satisfy µk ≡ 1 (%M¯), then cµ % M is the k-th root.
Further, we have Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 2. For the congruence xk ≡ c (%M)with M prime, if k | M¯ and gcd(k, M¯/k)= 1, then when c is an k-th power residue
modulo M, and µ satisfies µk ≡ 1 (%M¯/k), cµ % M is an k-th root.
Theorem 3. For the congruence xk ≡ c (%M)with M prime, if k - M¯, let h= gcd(k, M¯), m = k/h, andµ satisfyµm ≡ 1 (%M¯/h),
then xk ≡ c (%M) is equivalent to
xh ≡ cµ(%M),
that is, the two congruences have the same set of solutions.
For the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, refer to [26], and for the proof of Theorem 3, refer to [27]. The solution which is
obtained in terms of Theorems 1 and 2, and may be written as a certain power of c moduloM is called the trivial solution to
the congruence xk ≡ c (%M) [27].
3.5. The identity verification algorithm
Assume that ({Ci}, α, β) is a related public key, and (Q , U) is a signature on the file or message F .
S1: Let H ← hash(F), whose binary form is b1 . . . bn.
S2: Compute G¯1 ←ni=1 Cbii %M .
S3: Compute X ← (α Q−1)QUT αQ n %M ,
Y ← (G¯Q1 U−1)USTβHQ
n−1+Hn%M.
S4: If X = Y , the identity is valid and F intact;
else the identity is invalid or F modified.
By running this algorithm, a verifier can judgewhether a signature is genuine or fake, prevent the signatory from denying
the signature, and prevent an adversary from modifying the file.
Definition 7. LetM be a prime. Seeking x ∈ [1, M¯] from y ≡ xx (%M) is called the transcendental logarithm problem, shortly
TLP.
In what follows, we argue the discriminant X ≡ Y (%M) at S4.
It is known from Section 3.1 that α≡ δ(δn+δWn−1)T ≡ δh¯(W δG0G1)S (%M) and β≡ δWnT (%M).
Let V ≡ (R−1W δG1)QUδλ (%M).
Since λmeets λS ≡ ((WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS)(δQ − HW ) (%M¯), let λ= kđÐ, where k is a integer, and then
Q QUV S ≡ (RG0)SQU(δh¯)QU(R−1W δG1)QUSδλS
≡ (W δG0G1)QUS(δh¯)QUδλS
≡ αQUδ((WQ )n−1+Σn−1i=0 (δQ )n−1−i(WH)i+rUS)(δQ−WH)
≡ αQUδδWn−1Q n−WnHQ n−1+(δQ )n−(WH)n+(δQ−WH)rUS
≡ αQUδ(δn+δWn−1)Q nδ−Wn(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUS(%M).
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Transposition yields
V S ≡ (αQ−1)QUδ(δn+δWn−1)Q nδ−Wn(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUS(%M).
Therefore, we have
V ST ≡ (αQ−1)QUT δ(δn+δWn−1)TQ nδ−TWn(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUST
≡ (αQ−1)QUTαQ nβ−(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUST
≡ Xβ−(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUST (%M).
In addition,
UUTV T ≡ (RW k−δ)QUT (δa¯Ðr)UT (R−1W δG1)QUT δλT
≡ (W kG1)QUT δa¯ÐrUT δλT
≡ G¯QUT1 δa¯ÐrUT δkđÐT
≡ G¯QUT1 δa¯ÐrUT (%M).
Transposition yields
V T ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)UT δa¯ÐrUT (%M).
Hence
V ST ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)UST δa¯ÐrUST (%M).
By the double congruence theorem (Theorem 4), there is
V ST ≡ Xβ−(HQ n−1+Hn)δa¯ÐrUST
≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)UST δa¯ÐrUST (%M).
Namely, X ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)UST βHQ n−1+Hn ≡ Y (%M).
3.6. The double congruence theorem
Theorem 4 (The Double Congruence Theorem). Assume that M is a prime, and that s and t satisfying gcd(s, t) = 1 are two
constants, then simultaneous equations
xs ≡ a (%M)
xt ≡ b (%M)
have the unique solution if and only if at ≡ bs (%M).
Proof. Necessity:
Assume that the simultaneous equations xs ≡ a (%M) and xt ≡ b (%M) have solutions.
Let x0 be a solution to the two equations, then xs0 ≡ a (%M) and xt0 ≡ b (%M).
Further, xst0 ≡ at (%M) and xts0 ≡ bs (%M) can be obtained.
Therefore, xst0 ≡ at ≡ bs (%M).
Sufficiency:
Assume that at ≡ bs (%M).
By the greatest common divisor theorem [14], there exists a pair of integers u and v making us+ vt = 1. Thus, there is
xus ≡ au (%M)
xvt ≡ bv (%M).
The above two equations multiplying yields
xus+vt ≡ x ≡ aubv(%M).
Furthermore, we have
(aubv)s ≡ ausbvs ≡ ausavt ≡ aus+vt ≡ a (%M)
(aubv)t ≡ autbvt ≡ busbvt ≡ bus+vt ≡ b (%M).
Accordingly, aubv is a solution to the original simultaneous equations.
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Uniqueness:
Let x0 ≡ aubv (%M).
Assume that another value x1 meets the equations xs ≡ a (%M) and xt ≡ b (%M) at one time.
Then, it holds that
xs1 ≡ a (%M) and xt1 ≡ b (%M).
By comparison, we have xs1 ≡ xs0 and xt1 ≡ xt0 (%M). Transposing gives
(x0x−11 )
s ≡ 1 and (x0x−11 )t ≡ 1 (%M).
If at least one between s and t is relatively prime to M¯ , by Theorem 1, there must be x0x−11 ≡ 1 (%M), namely x0 ≡
x1 (%M).
If neither s nor t is coprime to M¯ , may let k= gcd(s, M¯), h= gcd(t , M¯). Then we see gcd(s/k, M¯)= 1 and gcd(t/h, M¯)= 1.
Thus, there are (x0x−11 )k ≡ 1 and (x0x−11 )h ≡ 1 (%M). By Theorem 3 and gcd(s, t) = 1, we know gcd(k, h) = 1. In terms
of the group theory [22], when gcd(k, h) = 1, only the element ‘1’ belongs to two different subgroup at the same time.
Therefore, x0x−11 ≡ 1, namely x1 = x0, and x0 bears uniqueness.
To sum up, we prove Theorem 4. 
3.7. Characteristics of REESSE1+
REESSE1+ owns the following characteristics compared with classical MH, RSA, and ElGamal cryptosystems.
• The security of REESSE1+ is not based on a single problem, but on the four problems: MPP, ASPP, TLP, and PRFP. Hence,
it is a multiproblem public key cryptosystem.
• The key transform Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n contains 2n+ 2 unknown variables, and each equation contains
four almost independent variables. Hence, REESSE1+ is multivariate.
• If any of Ai,W , and ℓ(i) is determined, the relation between the two remainders is still nonlinear, and thus there is very
complicated nonlinear relations among Ai,W , and ℓ(i).
• The indeterminacy of ℓ(.) with δ = 1. If Ci and W are determined, Ai and ℓ(i) cannot be determined, and even have no
one-to-one relation whenW is a non-generator. If Ci and Ai are determined,W and ℓ(i) cannot be determined, and also
have no one-to-one relation for gcd(ℓ(i), M¯) > 1.
• The insufficiency of the mapping. A private key includes {Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , δ etc, but there is only a dominant mapping from
{Ai} to {Ci}, and thus the invertibility of the transform function is poor.
• Because combinations among multiple variables may bring different hardnesses, REESSE1+ is a self-improvable
cryptosystem while its main architecture remains unchanged.
3.8. Correctness of the decryption algorithm
Since (Z∗M , ·) is an Abelian, namely commutative group, ∀k ∈ [1, M¯], there is
W k(W−1)k ≡ W kW−k ≡ 1(%M).
Let b1 . . . bn be an n-bit plaintext.
It is known from Section 3.2 that G¯ ≡ ni=1 Cbii (%M), where bi means what the algorithm shows, and Ci ≡
(AiW ℓ(i))δ %M .
Let G ≡ni=1 Abii (%M), and k =ni=1 ℓ(i)bi.
Then,we need to prove that G¯δ
−1
(W−1)k ≡ G (%M).
Proof. According to the key generator and the encryption algorithm, there is
G¯ ≡
n
i=1
Cbii ≡
n
i=1
((AiW ℓ(i))δ)bi
≡ W (
n
i=1 biℓ(i))δ
n
i=1
(Ai)δbi
≡ W kδ

n
i=1
Abii
δ
(%M).
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Further, raising either side of the above equation to the δ−1-th yields
G¯
δ−1 ≡
W kδ  n
i=1
Abii
δδ−1
≡ W k
n
i=1
Abii (%M).
Multiplying either side of the just above equation by (W−1)k yields
G¯
δ−1
(W−1)k ≡ W k
n
i=1
Abii (W
−1)k
≡ W k
n
i=1
Abii (W
k)−1
≡
n
i=1
Abii ≡ G (%M).
Clearly, the above process also gives a method of seeking Gmeantime. 
Notice that in practice, b1 . . . bn is unknowable in advance, so we have no way to directly compute k. However, because
the range of k ∈ (5n, n(2n+ 3)) is very narrow, we may search k heuristically by multiplyingW−2, and verify whether G =
1 after it is divided exactly by some Abii . It is known from Section 3.3 that the original b1 . . . bn is acquired at the same time
the condition G = 1 is satisfied.
3.9. Uniqueness of a plaintext solution to a ciphertext
Because {C1, . . . , Cn} is a non-coprime sequence, the mapping from
n
i=1 C
bi
i % M to G¯ (see Section 3.2) is theoretically
many-to-one. It might possibly result in the nonuniqueness of a plaintext solution b1 . . . bn when G¯ is being unveiled.
Suppose that the ciphertext G¯ can be obtained from two different anomalous subset products corresponding to b1 . . . bn
and b′1 . . . b′n respectively. Then,
G¯ ≡
n
i=1
Cbii ≡
n
i=1
C
b′i
i (%M).
That is,
n
i=1
(AiW ℓ(i))δbi ≡
n
i=1
(AiW ℓ(i))δb
′
i (%M).
Further, there is
W kδ
n
i=1
(Ai)δbi ≡ W k′δ
n
i=1
(Ai)δb
′
i (%M),
where k =ni=1 bi ℓ(i), and k′ =ni=1 b′i ℓ(i) % M¯ .
Raising either side of the above congruence to the δ−1-th power yields
W k
n
i=1
Aibi ≡ W k′
n
i=1
A
b′i
i (%M).
Without loss of generality, let k ≥ k′. Because (Z∗M , ·) is an Abelian group, there is
W k−k
′ ≡
n
i=1
A
b′i
i

n
i=1
Abii
−1
(%M).
Let θ≡ni=1 Abii (ni=1 Abii )−1 (%M), namely θ≡ W k−k′ (%M).
The above congruence signifies that when the plaintext b1. . .bn is not unique, the value ofW must be relevant to θ . The
contrapositive assertion equivalent to it is that if the value ofW is irrelevant to θ , b1 . . . bn will be unique. Thus, we need to
consider the probability thatW takes a value relevant to θ .
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If an adversary tries to attack an 80-bit symmetric key through exhaustive search, and a computer can verify trillion
values per second, it will take 38,334 years for the adversary to verify all the potential values. Hence, currently 80 bits are
quite enough for the security of a symmetric key.
b1 . . . bn contains n bitswhich indicates
n
i=1 A
bi
i has 2
n potential values, and thus the number of potential values of θ is at
most 2n×2n. Notice that because A−11 , . . . , A−1n are not necessarily coprime, some values of θ may possibly occur repeatedly.
Because |k − k′| ≤ n(2n + 3) − 5n ≤ 32512 ≈ 215 with n ≤ 128, and W has at most 215 solutions to every θ , the
probability thatW takes a value relevant to θ is at most 21522n/M . When n ≥ 80, there is
21522n/M ≤ 2175/2696 = 1/2521
which is close to zero. The probability will further decrease when W is a prime since the solutions to θ lean toward being
composite integers averagely.
In addition, if resorting to
n
i=1 bi = n, you may exclude some unoriginal plaintext solutions.
4. Security analysis of the key transform
We analyze the exact security of the REESSE1+ key transform Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n, whereW , δ∈ [1, M¯],
ℓ(i) ∈Ω= {5, 7, . . . , 2n+ 3}, and Ai ∈ Λ = {2, 3, . . . , 1201}.
We know that when n= 80, 96, 112, or 128, there is ⌈lgM⌉≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216. In this case, IFP and DLP can almost
be solved in tolerable time, and LSSP with D ≈ n/⌈lgM⌉ can also be solved in tolerable time [11,28]. In addition, because
the root finding problem (RFP) y ≡ xk (%M) may be converted into a linear congruence through a discrete logarithm, RFP
can also be solved in tolerable time when DLP can be solved in tolerable time.
‘Tolerable time’ indicates that the running time of an algorithm for solving a problem may be accepted by a user when
the time dominant parameter is relatively small. For example, when n= 80, the time O(2n/2) is tolerable, and when ⌈lgM⌉
= 384, O(LM [1/3, 1.923])= 256 is also tolerable [29].
A public key may be regarded as the cipher of a private key. Since a ciphertext is the mutual effect of a public key and a
plaintext, averagely the ciphertext has no direct help to inferring the private key.
Definition 8. Let A and B be two computational problems. A is said to reduce to B in polynomial time, written as A ≤PT B, if
there is an algorithm for solving Awhich calls, as a subroutine, a hypothetical algorithm for solving B, and runs in polynomial
time, excluding the time of the algorithm for B [25,28].
The hypothetical algorithm for solving B is called an oracle. It is easy to understand that nomatter what the running time
of the oracle is, it does not influence the result of the comparison.
A ≤PT B means that the difficulty of A is not greater than that of B, namely the running time of the fastest algorithm for
A is not greater than that of the fastest algorithm for Bwhen all polynomial times are treated as being pairwise equivalent.
Concretely speaking, if A cannot be solved in polynomial or subexponential time, B cannot also be solved in corresponding
polynomial or subexponential time; and if B can be solved in polynomial or subexponential time, A can also be solved in
corresponding polynomial or subexponential time.
Definition 9. Let A and B be two computational problems. If A ≤PT B and B ≤PT A, then A and B are said to be computationally
equivalent, written as A =PT B [25,28].
A =PT Bmeans that either if A is a hardness of a certain complexity on condition that the dominant variable approaches a
large number, B is also a hardness of the same complexity on the identical condition; or A, B both can be solved in linear or
polynomial time.
Definitions 8 and 9 suggest a reductive proof method called polynomial time Turing reduction (PTR) [25]. Provable
security by PTR is substantially relative and asymptotic just as a one-way function is. Relative security implies that the
security of a cryptosystem based on a problem is comparative, but not absolute. Asymptotic security implies that even if
a cryptosystem based on a problem is proven to be secure, it is practically secure only on condition that the dominant
parameter is large enough.
Naturally, we will enquire whether A<PT B exists or not. The definition of A<
P
T Bmay possibly be given theoretically, but
the proof of A<PT B is not easy in practice.
Let Hˆ(y = f (x)) represent the complexity or hardness of solving the problem y = f (x) for x [30].
4.1. MPP is at least equivalent to DLP
Definition 4 refers to Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n as MPP. It has the following property.
Property 4. MPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
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Proof. Firstly, systematically consider Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Assume that gi ≡ AiW ℓ(i) (%M) for each i is a constant.
Let
gi ≡ gxi (%M), and zi ≡ δxi (%M¯),
where g ∈ Z∗M be a generator.
Then, there is
Ci ≡ gδi ≡ gδxi(%M) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Again let δxi ≡ zi (%M¯). Then
Ci ≡ gzi(%M) for i = 1, . . . , n.
The above expression corresponds to the fact that in the ElGamal cryptosystem with many users sharing a modulus and
a generator, user 1 acquires the private key z1 and the public key C1, . . ., user n acquires the private key zn and the public
key Cn. It is well known that in this case, attack of adversaries is still faced with DLP, namely seeking zi from Ci ≡ gzi (%M)
for i = 1, . . . , n is equivalent to DLP [8].
Thus, when every gi is weakened to a constant, seeking δ from Ci ≡ gδi (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n is equivalent to DLP, which
indicates that when every gi is not a constant, seeking gi and δ from Ci ≡ gδi (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n is at least equivalent
to DLP.
Secondly, singly consider a certain Ci, where the subscript i is designated.
Assume that O¯m(Ci,M , R) is an oracle on solving Ci ≡ gδi (%M) for gi and δ, where i is in {1, . . . , n}, and R is a constraint
on gi such that the original gi can be found.
Let y ≡ gx (%M) be of DLP. Then, by calling O¯m(y,M , g), x can be obtained.
According to Definition 8, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ gx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(Ci ≡ gδi (%M)),
which means that when only a certain gi is known, seeking gi and δ from Ci ≡ gδi (%M) is at least equivalent to DLP.
Integrally, seeking the original {Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , and δ from Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M) for i = 1, . . . , n is computationally at least
equivalent to DLP in the same prime field. 
Further, the following analysis will incline people to believe that MPP is harder than DLP.
4.2. Attacks by interaction of the key transform items
Every ℓ(i) ∈ {5, 7, . . . , 2n + 3} and every Ai ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 1201} are the thinness of Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M). Naturally
adversaries will adopt combinational attack measures around the thinness.
4.2.1. Eliminating W through ℓ(x1)+ ℓ(x2) = ℓ(y1)+ ℓ(y2)
∀x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ [1, n], assume that there is ℓ(x1)+ ℓ(x2)= ℓ(y1)+ ℓ(y2).
Let Gz ≡ Cx1Cx2 (Cy1Cy2)−1 (%M), namely
Gz ≡ (Ax1Ax2(Ay1Ay2)−1)δ(%M).
If the adversaries divine the values of Ax1 , Ax2 , Ay1 , and Ay2 , and compute u, vx1 , vx2 , vy1 , vy2 in time of at least
LM [1/3, 1.923] such that
Gz ≡ gu, Ax1 ≡ gvx1 , Ax2 ≡ gvx2 , Ay1 ≡ gvy1 , Ay2 ≡ gvy2 (%M),
where g is a generator of (Z∗M , ·), then
u ≡ (vx1 + vx2 − vy1 − vy2)δ (%M¯).
If gcd(vx1 + vx2 − vy1 − vy2 , M¯) |u, the congruence in δ has solutions. Because each of Ax1 , Ax2 , Ay1 , Ay2 may traverse the
intervalΛ, the subscripts x1, x2, y1, y2 are unfixed, and the congruence may have n solutions, the number of potential values
of δ is about n5 ∥Λ∥4.
In succession, themost effectual approach seekingW is that for every i, divine Ai and ℓ(i), find Vi by Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M),
namely the value set of W , and if there exists W1 ∈ V1, . . . ,Wn ∈ Vn being equal pairwise, the divination of δ, {Ai}, and
{ℓ(i)} is thought right. Notice that to avoid seeking ℓ(i)-th roots, we may letW = gµ %M .
Due to
k
i=1 p
ei
i |M¯ , where kmeets pk ≈ 2n, there is ℓ(i)|M¯ , and the size of every Vi is about n ∥Ω∥ ∥Λ∥.
In summary, the running time of the above attack is at least
= n∥Λ∥LM [1/3, 1.923] + (2n5∥Λ∥4)2⌈lgM⌉2 + (2n5∥Λ∥4)(n∥Ω∥∥Λ∥)n(2⌈lgM⌉2).
When n = 80 with ⌈lgM⌉ ≈ 696, = 2110 > 2n.
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When n = 96 with ⌈lgM⌉ ≈ 864, = 2115 > 2n.
When n = 112 with ⌈lgM⌉ ≈ 1030, = 2125 > 2n.
When n = 128 with ⌈lgM⌉ ≈ 1216, = 2129 ≈ 2n.
Therefore, is not less than a quantity of time exponential in n.
Clearly, the running time of attack by eliminating W through ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2) + ℓ(x3) = ℓ(y1) is the same as that of the
attack by eliminatingW through ℓ(x1)+ ℓ(x2)= ℓ(y1)+ ℓ(y2).
4.2.2. Eliminating W through the ∥W∥-th power
Due to ⌈lgM⌉ ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216, M¯ can be factorized in tolerable time. Again due toki=1 peii |M¯ andki=1 ei ≥
210, where kmeets pk ≈ 2n, ∥W∥ can be divined in the running time of about 210.
Raising either side of Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ %M to the ∥W∥-th power yields
C∥W∥i ≡ (Ai)δ∥W∥%M.
Let Ci ≡ gui (%M), and Ai ≡ gvi (%M), where g is a generator of (Z∗M , ·). Then
ui∥W∥ ≡ vi∥W∥δ (%M¯)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that ui ≠ vi δ (%M¯).
The above congruence looks to be the MH transform [8]. Actually, {v1 ∥W∥, . . . , vn ∥W∥} is not a super increasing
sequence, and moreover there is not necessarily lg (ui ∥W∥)= lg M¯ .
Because vi ∥W∥ ∈ [1, M¯ ] is stochastic, the inverse δ−1 % M¯ need not be close to the minimum M¯/(ui ∥W∥), 2M¯/(ui
∥W∥), . . . , or (ui ∥W∥ − 1)M¯/(ui ∥W∥). Namely δ−1 may lie at any integral position of the interval [kM¯/ (ui ∥W∥),
(k + 1)M¯/(ui ∥W∥)], where k = 0, 1, . . . , ui ∥W∥ − 1, which illustrates the accumulation points of minima do not exist.
Further observing, in this case, when i traverses the interval [2, n], the number of intersections of the intervals including
δ−1 is likelymax2≤i≤n {ui ∥W∥} which is promisingly close to M¯ . Therefore, the Shamir attack by the accumulation point of
minima is fully ineffectual [9].
Even if find out δ−1 by the Shamir attackmethod, because each of vi has∥W∥ solutions, the number of potential sequences
{gv1 , . . . , gvn} is up to ∥W∥n. Because of needing to verify whether {gv1 , . . . , gvn} is a coprime sequence for each different
sequence {v1, . . . , vn}, the number of coprime sequences is in proportion to ∥W∥n. Hence, the initial {A1, . . . , An} cannot
be determined in polynomial time. Further, the value of W cannot be computed, and the values of ∥W∥ and δ−1 cannot
be verified in polynomial time, which indicates that MPP can also be resistant to the attack by the accumulation point of
minima.
Additionally, the adversaries may divine value of Ai in running time of about ∥Λ∥, where i ∈ [1, n], and compute δ by ui
∥W∥ ≡ vi ∥W∥δ (%M¯). However, because of ∥W∥ |M¯ , the equation will have ∥W∥ solutions. Therefore, the running time of
finding the original δ is at least
= n∥Λ∥LM [1/3, 1.923] + 210∥Λ∥∥W∥
= n∥Λ∥LM [1/3, 1.923] + 210∥Λ∥2n−20
≈ n∥Λ∥LM [1/3, 1.923] + 2n > 2n.
It is at least exponential in nwhen 80≤ n ≤ 128.
Again, it is infeasible to separate h¯, δ, W , and
n
i=1 Ai distinctly from α ≡ h¯δ(W
n
i=1 Ai)−δS (%M), and the time
complexity of seeking δ, W from α ≡ δ(δn+δWn−1)T and β ≡ δWnT (%M) will be at least O(2n) (see Section 6.3.3), so even
if the three equations are considered simultaneously, it is also impossible to determine the values of the four variables
almost independently.
In summary, the time complexity of inferring a related private key from a public key is at least O(2n).
4.3. Attack by a certain single Ci
Assume that there is only a solitary Ci = (AiW ℓ(i))δ %M − i = 1 for example, and other C ′i s (i = 2, . . . , n) are unknown
for attackers.
Through divining A1 ∈Λ and ℓ(1) ∈Ω , the parametersW and δ∈ (1, M¯) can be computed. Thus, the number of solution
(A1, ℓ(1),W , δ) will be up to ∥Ω∥ ∥Λ∥ M¯2 > 2n, which manifests that the original (A1, ℓ(1),W , δ) cannot be determined in
time being subexponential in n [30].
Evidently, if g1 ≡ A1W ℓ(1) (%M) is a constant, solving C1 = gδ1 %M for δ is equivalent to DLP. Factually, g1 is not a constant.
At present, seeking the original g1, δ will take at least O(M) > O(2n) steps.
5. Security analysis of the encryption algorithm
The security of the encryption algorithm is namely the security of a REESSE1+ ciphertect.
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5.1. ASPP is at least equivalent to DLP
Definition 5 refers to G¯1 ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) as SPP. It has the following property.
Property 5. SPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Proof. Let G¯1 ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M), where b1 . . . bn is a plaintext block.
Especially, define G¯1 ≡ni=1 C2n−ibi ≡ni=1(C2n−i)bi (%M)when C1 = · · · = Cn = C .
Obviously,
n
i=1 C
bi
i = LM + G¯1. Owing to L ∈ [1, M¯], deriving the non-modular product
n
i=1 C
bi
i from G¯1 is infeasible,
which means inferring b1 . . . bn from G¯1 is not a factorization problem.
Assume that O¯s(G¯1, C1, . . . , Cn,M) is an oracle on solving G¯1 ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) for b1 . . . bn.
Let y ≡ gx (%M) be of DLP,where g is a generator of (Z∗M , ·), and the binary formof x is b′1 . . . b′n, namely y ≡
n
i=1(g2n−i)b
′ i
(%M).
Then, by calling O¯s(y, g2
n−1
, . . . , g,M), x namely b′1 . . . b′n can be found.
By Definition 8, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ gx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ

G¯1 ≡
n
i=1
Cbii (%M)

,
namely SPP is at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field in complexity. 
Definition 6 refers to G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) as ASPP. It has a similar property.
Property 6. ASPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Proof. Assume that O¯a(G¯, C1, . . . , Cn,M) is an oracle on solving G¯ ≡ ni=1 Cbii (%M) for b1 . . . bn, where b1 . . . bn is the bit
shadow string of b1 . . . bn.
Especially, define G¯ ≡ ni=1 Cnn−ibi ≡ ni=1(Cnn−i)bi (%M) with the stipulation bi < n (namely that b1 . . . bn contains at
least two nonzero bits) when C1 = · · · = Cn = C .
Let G¯1 ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) be of SPP.
Due to 0 ≤ bi ≤ bi, by calling O¯a(G¯1, C1, . . . , Cn,M), b1 . . . bn can be found.
By Definition 8, there is Hˆ(G¯1 ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M)).
Further by transitivity, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ gx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ

G¯ ≡
n
i=1
Cbii (%M)

,
namely ASPP is at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field in complexity. 
It is very interesting whether ASPP is harder than DLP or not. We can find some positive evidence.
Piece 1 of evidence:
Observe an extreme case.
Assume that C1 = · · · = Cn = C , then we have G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbinn−i (%M)which may be written as
G¯ ≡ C
n
i=1 binn−i(%M).
Let
z =
i=1
n
bin
n−i.
Correspondingly,
G¯ ≡ C z(%M),
which is a form of DLP.
However, when C1, . . . , Cn are generated, we can check C1, . . . , Cn to prevent any two elements in {C1, . . . , Cn} from
being equal. Therefore, in practice, ASPP cannot be reduced to DLP in any time.
Piece 2 of evidence:
Assume that DLP can be solved in tolerable subexponential time.
When DLP can be solved in tolerable time, M¯ can also be factorized [14,25], so a generator can be found through the
Algorithm 4.80 in Section 4.6 of [25].
Let C1 ≡ gu1 (%M), . . . , Cn ≡ gun (%M), G¯ ≡ gv (%M), where g is a generator of (Z∗M , ·).
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Then, solving G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M) for b1 . . . bn is equivalent to solving
b1u1 + · · · + bnun ≡ v(%M¯)
which is called the anomalous subset sum problem (ASSP) due to bi ≥ bi, and computationally at least equivalent to SSP.
It has been proven that SSP is NP-complete in its feasibility recognition form, and the computational version of SSP with
the sufficiently large length and density is NP-hard [4,25]. Hence, solving ASSP is at least NP-hard. Additionally, the density
relevant to ASSP is far greater than 1 because of bi ≥ bi, which indicates that the L3 lattice base reduction attack on ASSPwill
be ineffectual (see Section 5.2). These two points illustrate that even although DLP can be solved, b1 . . . bn, namely b1 . . . bn
cannot be found yet in polynomial time.
The above two pieces of evidence incline us to believe that ASPP is harder than DLP.
By the way, LSSP will degenerate to a polynomial time problem from NPC [11,31].
5.2. ASPP can resist L3 lattice base reduction
It is known from Section 3.2 that the ciphertext G¯ ≡ni=1 Cbii (%M).
Still let C1 ≡ gu1 (%M), . . . , Cn ≡ gun (%M), G¯ ≡ gv (%M), where g is a generator of (Z∗M , ·) randomly selected.
Then, seeking b1 . . . bn from G¯ is equivalent to solving the congruence
u1b1 + · · · + unbn ≡ v (%M¯), (1)
where v may be substituted with v + kM¯ with k ∈ [0, n − 1] [32]. {u1, . . . , un} is called a compact sequence due to bi ∈
[0, n] and n > 1.
Recall [10,11]. Let {a1, . . . , an} be a positive integer sequence, eˆ = ⟨e˙1, . . . , e˙n, 0⟩with e˙i ∈ [0, 1] be the solution vector,
s =ni=1 ai e˙i, and t =ni=1 ai.
In [10], there are two important conditions:
t/n ≤ s ≤ (n− 1)t/n, and ∥eˆ∥2 ≤ n/2,
where ∥eˆ∥ denotes the distance in l2-Norm of the vector ê, which decides the threshold density< 0.6463.
In [11], there are similar
t/n ≤ s ≤ (n− 1)t/n, and ∥eˆ∥2 ≤ n/4,
which decide the threshold density< 0.9408.
However, for (1), due to 0≤ bi ≤ n, the similar conditions do not hold.
It is well understood that the L3 lattice base reduction algorithm is employed in cryptanalysis to find the shortest vector
or approximately shortest vectors in a lattice, and hence, if a solution to SSP has a comparatively big distance, or is not
unique, it will not occur in the reduced base.
Let L be a lattice spanned by the vectors
⟨1, 0, . . . , 0, Nu1⟩,
⟨0, 1, . . . , 0, Nu2⟩,
...
...
...
...
...
⟨0, 0, . . . , 1, Nun⟩,
⟨0, 0, . . . , 0, N(v + kM¯)⟩
which compose a base of the lattice, where N is a positive integer greater than (n2)1/2 = n (but not much greater, or else
will influence speed of the L3 reduction algorithm). Notice that because g is random, L is also random.
Let D be the determinant relevant to a matrix corresponding to the lattice base. Then, by the Guassian heurisic, the
expected size of the shortest vector in L of n+ 1 dimensions lies between [15]
D1/(n+1)((n+ 1)/(2πe))1/2 and D1/(n+1)((n+ 1)/(πe))1/2,
where e ≈ 2.7182818.
In our case, there is ⌈lgM⌉/(n+ 1)≈ 9, and the above scope is between
(Nk29(n+1))1/(n+1)((n+ 1)/(2πe))1/2 and (Nk29(n+1))1/(n+1)((n+ 1)/(πe))1/2.
Roughly, between
29((n+ 1)/24)1/2 = 27(n)1/2 and 27(2n)1/2 = 29((n+ 1)/23)1/2.
For (1), the largest distance of the solution vector ⟨b1, . . . , bn, 0⟩ is n ∈ {80, 96, 112, 128}, and thus it is very possible
that the solution vector will not occur in the reduced base. Meanwhile, it will also be influenced by the knapsack density
relevant to (1) whether the solution vector surely occurs in the reduced base.
S. Su, S. Lü / Theoretical Computer Science 426–427 (2012) 91–117 105
To compute the density of the compact sequence, we extend {u1, . . . , un} into
{u1, 2u1, . . . , nu1, u2, 2u2, . . . , nu2, . . . . . . , un, 2un, . . . , nun}.
It is not difficult to understand that the length of the extend sequence is n2.
The density of the compact sequence {u1, . . . , un} is
D ≈ n2/⌈lgM⌉.
When n = 80 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 696, D ≈ 9.19> 2> 1.
When n = 96 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 864, D ≈ 10.66> 2> 1.
When n = 112 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 1030, D ≈ 12.18> 2> 1.
When n = 128 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 1216, D ≈ 13.47> 2> 1.
D > 2 indicates that a great many different subsets will have the identical sum, namely the solution to (1) is not unique,
and the original solution is possibly not shortest for bi ∈ [0, n]. Thus, it is very likely that the original solution does not occur
in the reduced base only containing n+ 1 vectors.
Further, we can estimate the time cost of the L3 lattice base attack.
Although SLLL, namely segment LLL in floating point arithmetic and L2-FP are two of currently fast lattice base reduction
algorithms [33,34], because floating point operation on integers greater than the modulus M with lgM ≥ 696 cannot
be executed directly, and even are instable under a low precision circumstance, it is inappropriate to utilize these two
algorithms to find the solution vector ⟨b1, . . . , bn, 0⟩, which manifests that the only classical L3 algorithm is appropriate.
According to [25], the running time of attack on Eq. (1) from ASPP by the lattice base reduction algorithm is roughly
≈ O(nLM [1/3, 1.923] + n(n+ 1)6(lgM2)3)
on condition that N is slightly greater than n.
When n = 80 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 696, ≈ 276.
When n = 96 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 864, ≈ 280.
When n = 112 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 1030, ≈ 282.
When n = 128 with ⌈lgM⌉ = 1216, ≈ 286.
However, as is pointed out in the above, owing to D> 9> 2> 1 and bi ∈ [0, n], it is almost impossible that the solution
vector ⟨b1, . . . , bn, 0⟩ occurs in the final reduced base, which means that attack by the L3 algorithm will be unavailing.
Besides, we also see that there exists an exhaustive search attack on the plaintext block b1 . . . bn. Clearly, the running
time of such an attack is O(2n) arithmetic steps.
Hence, the security of a REESSE1+ plaintext is built on the problem G¯ ≡ ni=1 Cbii (%M) which contains the trapdoor
information, and means that computing an anomalous subset product from subset elements is tractable while seeking the
subset elements from the product is intractable.
5.3. Avoid adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack
Theoretically, most public key cryptosystems may probably be faced with adaptive-chosen- ciphertext attack.
During the late 1990s, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack on SSL servers
using a form of the RSA encryption [35]. Almost at the same time, The Cramer–Shoup asymmetric encryption algorithm
which is extremely malleable, and an extension of the Elgamal algorithm was proposed [36]. It is the first efficient scheme
proven to be secure against the adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack using standard cryptographic assumptions,which implies
that not all uses of cryptographic hash functions require random oracles—some require only the property of collision
resistance.
5.3.1. Different ciphertexts of the identical plaintext
It is lucky that REESSE1+ can avoid the adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack when a REESSE1+ ciphertext is produced
according to the following algorithm:
Paralleling Section 3.2, assume that b1 . . . bn is a plaintext block, and {C1, . . . , Cn} is a public key.
S1: Set k ← 0, i ← 1.
S2: If bi = 0, let k ← k+ 1, bi ← 0;
else let bi ← k+ 1, k ← 0.
S3: Let i ← i+ 1.
If i ≤ n, go to S2.
S4: Randomly produce s1 . . . sn ∈ {0, 1}n.
S5: If bn = 0, set d ← n− k, sd = 1, bd ← bd + k;
else sn = 1.
S6: Compute G¯←ni=1(Cisi+(i−bi+1)¬si)bi %M with Cn+1 = 1.
Clearly, when the identical plaintext is inputted many times, the above algorithm will return a ciphertext different from
one another every time.
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It is easily understood that contrarily, a ciphertext can almost uniquely be decrypted in polynomial time in terms of
Sections 3.3 and 3.9.
Paralleling Section 3.3, we design a related decryption algorithm of which the running time is equivalent to that of the
algorithm in Section 3.3.
Assume that ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , δ, Ð, đ , h¯) is a related private key, and G¯ is a ciphertext.
Notice that because
n
i=1 bi = n is even,
n
i=1 biℓ(i)must be even.
S1: Compute G¯← G¯δ−1 %M .
S2: Compute G¯← G¯W−2 %M .
S3: Set b1 . . . bn, e¨, j, k ← 0, G ← G¯, i ← 1.
S4: If Ae¨+1i |G, let e¨ ← e¨+ 1, go to S4.
S5: If e¨ = 0,
let k ← k+ 1, i ← i+ 1;
else
compute G ← G/Ae¨i ;
if k> 0 or i+ e¨− 1 = n, let bi ← 1; else bi+e¨−1 ← 1;
if k = 0, let i ← i+ e¨; else i ← i+ 1;
if k+ 1 > e¨, let i ← n+ 1;
set e¨, k ← 0.
S6: If i ≤ n and G ≠ 1, go to S4.
S7: If G ≠ 1, go to S2; else end.
In this way, the original plaintext block b1 . . . bn is recovered although s1 . . . sn is introduced in encryption. Besides, in
decryption, {ℓ(i)}, Ð, đ , and h¯ are unhelpful.
5.3.2. Appending of a stochastic binary string
Another approach to avoiding the adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack is to append a stochastic fixed-length binary
sequence to the terminal of every plaintext block when it is encrypted. For a concrete implementation, refer to the OAEP+
scheme [37].
6. Security analysis of the digital signature
The security of the REESSE1+ signature includes three aspects: a private key cannot inferred from a signature, a signature
cannot be forged through known signatures, public keys, and algorithms, and a message cannot be forged through a known
or chosen signature.
6.1. Unforgeability of a signature in the random oracle model
Because REESSE1+ is amultiproblem cryptosystem, andMPP preventing a forged signature from being obtained from the
signature algorithm is different from TLP or PRFP preventing a forged signature from being obtained from the verification
algorithm, the proof in the random oracle model (RO model) given below is incomplete, and only offers another piece of
evidence for the security of the REESSE1+ signature.
6.1.1. What is a random oracle
An oracle is a mathematical abstraction, a theoretical black box, or a subroutine of which the running time may not be
considered [25,38]. In particular, in cryptography, an oracle may be treated as a subcomponent of an adversary, and lives its
own life independent of the adversary. Usually, the adversary interacts with the oracle but cannot control its behavior.
A random oracle is an oracle which answers to every query with a completely random and unpredictable value chosen
uniformly from its output domain, except that for any specific query, it outputs the same value every time it receives that
query if it is supposed to simulate a deterministic function [38].
Random oracles are utilized in cryptographic proofs for replacing any irrealizable function so far which can provide
the mathematical properties required by the proof. A cryprosystem or a protocol that is proven secure using such a proof is
described as being secure in the ROmodel, as opposed to being secure in the standardmodel where IFP, DLP etc are assumed
to behard.When a randomoracle is usedwithin a security proof, it ismade available to all participants, including adversaries.
In practice, randomoracles producing a bit-string of infinite lengthwhich can be truncated to the length desired are typically
used to model cryptographic hash functions in schemes where strong randomness assumptions of a hash function’s output
are needed.
In fact, it draws attention that certain artificial signature and encryption schemes are proven secure in the ROmodel, but
are trivially insecure when any real function such as the hash function MD5 or SHA-1 is substituted for the random oracle
[39]. Nevertheless, for any more natural protocol, a proof of security in the RO model gives very strong evidence that an
attacker have to discover some unknown and undesirable property of the hash function used in the protocol.
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6.1.2. The forking lemma
Lemma 1 (The Forking Lemma). Let Aˆ be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, given only the public data as input.
If Aˆ can find, with non-negligible probability, a valid signature ( , σ1, , σ 2), then, with non-negligible probability, a replay
of this machine, with the same random tape and a different oracle, outputs two valid signatures ( , σ1, , σ2) and ( , σ1,′, σ ′2) such that ≠ ′ [40].
In [40], the forking lemma is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital signature scheme instantiated in the
RO model. D. Pointcheval and J. Stern show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then
there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random tape can create a second forgery in an
attack with a different random oracle. The forking lemma was later generalized by Bellare and Neven [41], and has been
used to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes and other cryptographic constructions based on random
oracles [42].
The forking lemma is applicable to such a type of signature scheme where a signer must perform the following steps to
sign the message :
① randomly produce a promise σ1 in a large set;
② compute = hash(σ1, );
③ compute σ 2 by using σ 1 and .
The signature output is a triple (σ1, , σ2).
For example, the Schnorr signature scheme [43] may be proven secure in the RO model according to the forking lemma
[40,42].
Assume that solving y ≡ gx (%M) for x is of DLP, where g is a generator ofZ∗M withM prime, and the input to an adversary
Aˆ is the public key y.
In terms of the forking lemma, the adversary can obtain two different signatures with non-negligible probability:
( , σ1 = g r %M, , σ2 = (x + r) % M¯), and ( , σ ′1 = g r
′
%M, ′, σ ′2 = (x ′ + r ′) % M¯),
where = hash(σ1, ) is an oracle query of the adversary Aˆ during his first play, and ′ = hash′(σ ′1, ) is an oracle query
of the adversary Aˆ during his second play.
The target of the adversary Aˆ is to extract the private key x from the signatures.
Since there is σ 1 = σ ′1, there is r = r ′. Hence, we have
( − ′)x ≡ (σ2 − σ ′2)(%M¯).
Because there always exists x, the above linear congruence in x has solutions, and x can be found in polynomial time,
namely DLP can be solved in polynomial time, which is in direct contradiction to the standard assumption. Therefore, it is
infeasible to forge a Schnorr signature.
6.1.3. Proof of unforgeability of a REESSE1+ signature
In Section 4.1, we prove that MPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP, and additionally at present, a
subexponential time algorithm for solving MPP is not found. Therefore, we may have a superstandard assumption
comparable to the standard assumption.
Assumption 1. MPP cannot be solved in subexponential time.
Firstly, we adapt the REESSE1+ signature algorithm to the modality outputting a triple signature.
Assume that ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)},W , δ, Ð, đ , h¯) is a private, and F is a file or message to be signed.
Define hash′(F , a¯) as hash′(F , a¯)= (a¯Ð+ hash(F)W )δ−1 %M¯ .
S1: Let H ← hash(F), whose binary form is b1 . . . bn.
S2: Randomly take a¯ ∈ (1, M¯), compute Q = hash′(F , a¯).
If (đT )|a¯ or đ | (WQ ) % M¯ , go to S2.
S3: Set k ← δni=1 bi ℓ(i) % M¯ , G0 ← (ni=1 A¬bii )δ %M .
S4: Compute R ← (Q (δh¯)−1)S−1G−10 , U¯ ← (RWk−δ)Q %M ,
g¯ ← δa¯Ð %M , ξ ←n−1i=0 (δQ)n−1−i(HW)i % M¯ .
S5: ∀r ∈ [1, đ216] making đ - (rUS + ξ) % M¯ ,
where U = U¯ g¯ r %M .
S6: If d - ((WQ )n−1 + rUS+ ξ ) % M¯ , go to S6, else end.
On executing this algorithm which is essentially equivalent to that in Section 3.4, one can obtain the signature (a¯, Q , U)
that is sent to a receiver together with F .
Secondly, prove the unforgeability of a signature in the RO model.
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Proof. Let a¯ be a promise produced by the signer. In terms of the forking lemma, during the two plays of the adversary
Aˆ, two valid signatures (a¯, Q , U) and (a¯′, Q ′, U ′) on the identical file F can be obtained. Then, it is known from the above
signature algorithm that
δQ ≡ a¯Ð+WH(%M¯),
δQ ′ ≡ a¯′Ð+WH ′(%M¯),
U ≡ (RW k−δ)Q δa¯Ðr(%M),
U ′ ≡ (R′W k ′−δ)Q ′δa¯′Ðr ′(%M),
where a¯ = a¯′, H = hash(F , a¯), and H ′ = hash′(F , a¯′).
Because there always existW , it may be obtained from the two formulas with H and H ′ that
W ≡ (Q − Q ′)(H − H ′)−1δ(%M¯). (2)
Similarly, it may be obtained from the two formulas with U and U ′ that
(RQR′−Q
′
)(W (k−δ)QW−(k
′−δ)Q ′)δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ UU ′−1(%M).
Multiplying either side of the above equation by GQ1 G
′−Q ′
1 gives
(RQR′−Q
′
)(W (k−δ)QGQ1 W
−(k ′−δ)Q ′G′−Q
′
1 )δ
−a¯Ð(r−r ′) ≡ UGQ1 U ′−1G′−Q
′
1 (%M),
namely
((Q (δh¯)−1)S
−1
G−10 )
Q ((Q ′(δh¯)−1)S
−1
G′−10 )
−Q ′(k Q1 W
−δQ k ′−Q
′
1 W
δQ ′)δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ UGQ1 U ′−1G′−Q
′
1 (%M),
where G′0 = (
n
i=1 A
¬b′i
i )
δ (%M) and G′1 = (
n
i=1 A
b′i
i )
δ (%M).
Further, there is
(δh¯)−S
−1(Q−Q ′)Q QS
−1
Q ′−Q
′S−1
(G−10 G¯1)
Q (G′0
−1G¯′1)
−Q ′(W−δ)Q−Q
′
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ UGQ1 U ′−1G′1−Q
′
(%M).
Through transposition, we see
((δh¯)−S
−1
W−δ)Q−Q
′
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ UGQ1 U ′−1G′1−Q
′
Q−QS
−1
Q ′Q
′S−1(G−10 G¯1)
−Q (G′0
−1G¯′1)
Q ′(%M).
SubstitutingW−δ with (h¯δα−1)S−1(
n
i=1 Ai)δ ≡ (h¯δα−1)S−1G0G1 (%M) yields
((δh¯)−S
−1
(h¯δα−1)S
−1
G0G1)Q−Q
′
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ (G0G1)Q (G′0G′1)−Q
′
UU ′−1Q−QS
−1
Q ′Q
′S−1 G¯−Q1 G¯
′
1
Q ′(%M),
namely
(α−S
−1
G0G1)Q−Q
′
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ (G0G1)Q (G′0G′1)−Q
′
UU ′−1Q−QS
−1
Q ′Q
′S−1 G¯−Q1 G¯
′
1
Q ′(%M).
Again through transposition, we see
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ (G0G1)Q (G′0G′1)−Q
′
UU ′−1Q−QS
−1
Q ′Q
′S−1 G¯−Q1 G¯
′
1
Q ′(α−S
−1
G0G1)Q
′−Q (%M).
Considering G0G1 ≡ G′0G′1 ≡ (
n
i=1 Ai)δ (%M), we have
δ−a¯Ð(r−r
′) ≡ UU ′−1Q−QS−1Q ′Q ′S−1 G¯−Q1 G¯′1Q
′
αS
−1(Q−Q ′)(%M). (3)
In (3), the right value is known, the promise a¯ is also known, D, a factor of M¯ , may be separated in subexponential time,
and r , r ′ ∈ [1, đ 216], (r − r ′)may be found in subexponential time through a heuristic approach, which means the integer
a¯Ð(r − r ′)may be obtained in subexponential time.
Solving (3) for δ is of RFP of which the complexity is not greater than that of DLP. Thus, δmay be found in subexponential
time, and then according to (2),W may be found.
In addition, by using Ci ≡ (AiW ℓ(i))δ (%M), Ai ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 1201}, ℓ(i) ∈ {5, 7, . . . , 2n + 1}, and {A1, . . . , An} being a
coprime sequence, the adversary may obtain {A1, . . . , An} and {ℓ(1), . . . , ℓ(n)} in expected subexponential time.
Further, according to U¯ ≡ (RW k−δ)Q (%M) in the signature algorithm, where k ≡ δni=1 bi ℓ(i) (%M¯), Rmay be found,
and according to R ≡ (Q (δh¯)−1)S−1G−10 (%M), h¯ may be found. In sum, the private key ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W , δ, Ð, đ , h¯) is found,
namelyMPP is also solved in subexponential time, which is in direct contradiction to Assumption 1. Therefore, it is infeasible
in subexponential time that the adversary forge a REESSE1+ promise signature (a¯, Q , U).
In practice, the promise a¯ is unpublicized, and therefore, it is at least the same infeasible in subexponential time that Aˆ
forges a REESSE1+ signature (Q , U). 
Notice that the REESSE1+ verification algorithm is built on the hardnesses different fromMPP, so this proof is incomplete
for the unforgeability of a REESSE1+ signature, and further security analysis is necessary.
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6.2. Extracting a private key from a signature is of TLP or the indeterminate problem
To analyze exact securities, we attend to the solution of xk ≡ c (%M) with M prime called RFP for a while. In some
cases, xk ≡ c (%M) has the trivial root which can be found in terms of Theorems 1 and 2. At present, there should be three
methods of solving xk ≡ c (%M): ① the algorithm through discrete logarithms [25] whose running time is LM [1/3, 1.923]; ②
the probabilistic algorithm [44] whose running time is the larger of O(2k−1) and O(M / k); ③ the algorithm offered by [45]
whose running time is O(k1/2 lgM). Obviously, when k is comparatively small, method 3 is most efficient.
In our analysis, we assume that RFP can be solved in tolerable time.
It is known from Section 3.4 that there exist
Q ≡ (RG0)Sδh¯ (%M),
U ≡ (RW k−δ)Q δa¯Ðr(%M).
Firstly, solving the two congruences separately.
According to Section 3.4, δa¯Ðr % M belongs to the subgroup of order đT . Because of T ≥ 2n, divining the value of δ a¯Ðr %
M is impossible.
Let e¯ = δa¯ÐrT %M be an element of the subgroup of order đ , then latter may be written as
UT ≡ (RW k−δ)QT e¯(%M).
When an attacker attempts to seek RG0 or RW k−δ , he has to solve the equation
xS ≡ Q δ−1h¯−1(%M), (4)
or
xQT ≡ UT e¯−1(%M). (5)
We see that the number of unknown variables in the two equations is greater than 2, and thus solving (4) and (5) is of
the indeterminate problem.
For (4), because δ, h¯ are unknown, and the right of (4) is not a constant, it is impossible to solve this equation for RG0. If
δ is divined, the probability of hitting δ is 1/∥δ∥ < 1/2n. Similarly it is impossible to divine h¯ owing to h¯ ∈ (1,M).
For (5), there is ∥e¯−1∥ ≤ đ . Assume that đ is guessed out, and all the solutions to xđ ≡ 1 (%M) can be found out, then
e¯−1 may possibly be figured.
However, even if e¯−1 is known, and the trivial root to (5) exists, the probability that the trivial root just equals the specific
R W k−δ is only 1/T ≤ 1/2n, and moreover due to the randomness of R, it is thoroughly impossible to separate δ, W , and k
from RW k−δ .
Secondly, solving the two congruences systematically.
Substituting R in UT ≡ (RW k−δ)QT e¯ (%M)with G−10 (Q (δh¯)−1)S−1 derived from Q ≡ (RG0)Sδh¯ (%M) gives
UT ≡ (G−10 (Q (δh¯)−1)S
−1
W k−δ)QT e¯(%M),
namely
UT ≡ (G−1G¯1(Q (δh¯)−1)S−1W−δ)QT e¯(%M),
where G ≡ G0G1 (%M). SinceW is a function of δ in β = δWnT %M , y = W−δ %M is of TLP.
Thus,
((GW δ)−1(δh¯)−S
−1
)QT ≡ UT (G¯1Q S−1)−QT e¯−1(%M).
Similarly, if e¯−1 is known, and (UT (G¯1Q S
−1
)−QT e¯−1)M¯/(Tgcd(Q ,M¯)) ≡ 1 (%M), through the index-calculus method, one may
find out all the solutions to the equation
xQT ≡ UT (G¯1Q S−1)−QT e¯−1(%M).
However, the probability that a certain solution is no other than (GW δ)−1(δh¯)−S−1 is less than 1/T ≤ 1/2n. Further, the
running time of distinguishing G,W , h¯, and δ from (GW δ)−1(δh¯)−S−1 is at least O(M¯ ).
Therefore, the time complexity of extracting a related private key from a signature is at least O(∥δ∥), O(T ), or O(M¯) ≥
O(2n), which elucidates that even if each element of the subgroup of order đ is known, it does not influence the security of
the private key.
6.3. Forging a digital signature only from a public key is a hardness
According to Section 3.5, the discriminant X ≡ Y (%M) contains the two variablesQ andU ofwhich onemay be supposed
in advance by an adversary. However, seeking the other by the supposed value is faced with TLP.
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6.3.1. TLP is at least equivalent to DLP
We observe y ≡ gx (%M) referred to as TLP by Definition 7.
Assume that g ∈ Z∗M is a generator, whereM is prime, then
{y | y ≡ gx(%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯} = Z∗M [22].
Assume that kwith gcd(k, M¯) = 1 is an integer, then also
{y | y ≡ xk(%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯} = Z∗M [22].
Therefore, ∀x ∈ [1, M¯], y ≡ gx (%M) or y ≡ xk (%M)with gcd(k, M¯) = 1 is a self-isomorph of the group Z∗M .
However, for the xx operation, {y | y ≡ xx (%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯}= Z∗M does not hold, that is,
{y | y ≡ xx(%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯} ≠ Z∗M .
For example, whenM = 11, {y | y ≡ xx (%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯}= {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}, where 33 ≡ 66 ≡ 88 ≡ 5 (%11).
WhenM = 13, {y | y ≡ xx (%M), x = 1, . . . , M¯} = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12}, where 77 ≡ 1111 ≡ 6 (%13), and 11 ≡ 33 ≡ 88 ≡
99 ≡ 1212 ≡ 1 (%13).
WhenM = 17, {y | y ≡ xx (%M), x = 1, . . ., M¯}= {1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14}, where 22 ≡ 1212 ≡ 4 (%17), 66 ≡ 1515 ≡
2 (%17), and 1010 ≡ 1414 ≡ 2 (%17).
The above examples illustrate that {y ≡ xx (%M)| x = 1, . . ., M¯} cannot construct a complete set for a group. Furthermore,
mapping from x to y is one-to-one sometimes, and many-to-one sometimes. That is, inferring x from y is indeterminate, x is
nonunique, and even nonexistent. Thus, xx has extremely strong irregularity, and is essentially distinct from gx and xk.
It should be noted that an attempt at solving y ≡ xx (%M) for x in light of the Chinese Remainder Theorem is specious.
Refer to the following example.
Observe the congruent equation 44 ≡ 8≡ 312 (%31), where 3 ∈ Z∗31 is a generator.
Try to seek xwhich satisfies x ≡ 12 (%30) and x ≡ 3 (%31) at one time, and verify whether x ≡ 4 (%31) or not.
In light of the Chinese Remainder Theorem [25], letm1 = 30,m2 = 31, a1 = 12, and a2 = 3. Then
M = 30× 31 = 930,
M1 = M/m1 = 930/30 = 31,
M2 = M/m2 = 930/31 = 30.
Compute y1 = 1 such thatM1y1 ≡ 1 (%m1).
Compute y2 = 30 such thatM2y2 ≡ 1 (%m2).
Thereby,
x = a1M1y1 + a2M2y2 = 12× 31× 1+ 3× 30× 30 = 282(%930).
It is not difficult to verify
282288 ≡ 8 ≠ 4 (%31), and 282288 ≡ 504 ≠ 8 ≠ 4 (%930).
The integer 282 is an element of the group (Z∗930, ·), and the element 4 of the group (Z∗31, ·) cannot be obtained from 282,
which is pivotal.
So, these examples manifest that TLP seems to be harder than DLP.
Property 7. TLP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Proof. ① Hˆ(y ≡ xx (%M)) =PT Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x (%M))
Let g ∈ Z∗M be a generator coprime to M¯ , which does not lose generality since g may be selected in practice.
Assume that y ∈ Z∗M is known, and there is
y ≡ (gx)x(%M).
Raising either side of the above equation to the g-th power gives
yg ≡ (gx)gx(%M).
Let
z ≡ yg(%M), and w = gx,
where the latter is not a congruence, and then
z ≡ ww(%M).
Suppose that O¯t(y, M , X) is an oracle on solving y ≡ xx (%M) for x, where X is the set of all the possible values of x, and
y ∈ [1, M¯].
Its output is x ∈ X (each of solutions), or 0 (no solution).
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Let X1 = {1, 2, . . . , M¯}, and X2 = {1 g , 2 g, . . . , M¯ g}.
Clearly, by calling O¯t(y,M , X1), y ≡ xx (%M) is solved for x.
It is easily observed that between the finite sets X1 and X2, there is a linear bijection
Γ : X1 → X2, Γ (a) = ga,
which means that the set X1 is equivalent to the set X2 [46]. Hence, substituting X1 with X2 as the codomain of a function
will not increase the running time of O¯t.
Similarly, by calling O¯t(z,M , X2), z ≡ ww (%M) is solved forw, namely all the satisfactory values ofw are obtained.
According tow = gx and z ≡ ww (%M), there is x ≡wg−1 (%M), or x ≡ wg−1 (% M¯).
Hence, in terms of Definition 8, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(y ≡ xx(%M)),
namely the difficulty in inverting y ≡ (gx)x (%M) is not greater than that in inverting y ≡ xx (%M).
On the other hand, suppose that O¯ (y, g ,M) is an oracle on solving y ≡ (gx)x (%M) for x, where y, g ∈ [1, M¯].
Its output is x ∈ [1, M¯] (each of solutions), or 0 (no solution).
Let g = 1.
By calling O¯ (y, 1,M), the solution x to y ≡ xx (%M)will be obtained.
Hence, in terms of Definition 8, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ xx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x(%M)).
Combinatorially, in terms of Definition 9, we have that
Hˆ(y ≡ xx(%M)) =PT Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x(%M)),
namely the difficulty in inverting y ≡ (gx)x (%M) is equivalent to that in inverting y ≡ xx (%M).
② Hˆ(y ≡ gx (%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x (%M))
The congruence y ≡ (gx)x (%M)may be written as y ≡ gxxx (%M), where g is any element.
Change O¯t(y, g ,M) into O¯t(y, g ,M , wˆ), where wˆ = 0 or 1. Its structure is as follows:
S1: If wˆ = 1 and x to y ≡ gxxx (%M) are nonexistent, return ‘No’.
S2: If wˆ = 1,
S2.1: find y1, and compute y2 by y ≡ y1y2 (%M);
S2.2: compute x < M by y1 ≡ gx (%M);
S2.3: if y2 ≠ xx (%M), go to S2.1;
else
S2.4: compute x < M by y ≡ gx (%M).
S3: Return x.
Clearly, by calling O¯t(y, g ,M , 0), the solution x to y ≡ gx (%M)will be obtained.
Hence, still in terms of Definition 8, there is
Hˆ(y ≡ gx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(y ≡ gxxx(%M)).
Integrating ① and ②, we have that
Hˆ(y ≡ gx(%M)) ≤PT Hˆ(y ≡ gxxx(%M)) =PT Hˆ(y ≡ xx(%M)),
namely inverting y ≡ xx (%M) is at least equivalent inverting y ≡ gx (%M) for x in complexity. 
In [47], we have a similar result by the asymptotic granularity reduction (AGR).
Further discussion.
Let y ≡ gv (%M), and x ≡ gu (%M), and then it seems that there is gv ≡ gugu (%M).
However due to gu (%M) ≠ gu (% M¯), y ≡ xx (%M) cannot be expressed as v ≡ ugu (%M¯).
We can also understand that in the process of x being sought from y ≡ xx (%M), it is inevitable that the middle value of
x is beyondM because modular multiplication, inverse, and power operations are inevitable.
Considering the middle value of x beyondM , let
z1 = x %M with z1 < M, and z2 = x % M¯ with z2 < M¯.
Then there are x = z1 + k1M = z2 + k2M¯ and z1 = (z2 − k2) % M , where k1, k2 ≥ 0 are two integers. Ahead, we have
y ≡ (g(z2− k2))z2 (%M). This formula indicates that due to x %M ≠ x %M¯ with x>M and k2 unfixable, the relation between
x %M¯ and x %M is stochastic when x changes in the interval (1,MM), which illuminates that it is reasonable to let q ≡ g
(z2 − k2) (%M), namely y ≡ qz2 (%M).
If q is a constant, inverting y ≡ qz2 (%M) is equivalent to DLP. However, q will not be a constant forever. Therefore, it
should be impossible anyway that Hˆ(y ≡ (gx)x (%M)) =PT Hˆ(y ≡ gx (%M)).
The above evidence inclines us to believe that TLP is harder than DLP, namely on the assumption that DLP can be solved
through an oracle, and TLP cannot be solved in DLP subexponential time yet.
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The famous baby-step giant-step algorithm, Pollard’s rho algorithm, Pohlig–Hellman algorithm, and index-calculus
algorithm for discrete logarithms [25] are ineffectual on transcendental logarithms. At present, there is no better method
for solving TLP than exhaustive search, and thus the running time of solving xx ≡ y (%M) may be expected to be O(M) >
O(2n).
Notice that for y ≡ xx (%M), there is no determinate relation between ∥y∥ and ∥x∥, namely ∥y∥ ≥ ∥x∥ or ∥y∥ < ∥x∥.
Therefore, in the case of a small modulus, x in y ≡ xx (%M) is still secure.
In REESSE1+, the form of TLP is y ≡ (cx)x (%M) with c known. When the bit-length of a modulus is very small—80 for
example, the difference between the running times of solving y ≡ (cx)x (%M) and y ≡ xx (%M) is valuable, where cx changes
with c , and has more freedom than a single x, which makes the relation between ∥y∥ and ∥x∥more indeterminate.
What needs to be emphasized is that TLP is more suitable for designing signature schemes due to the non-uniqueness of
its solutions.
6.3.2. Forging a signature from the verification algorithm is of TLP or PRFP
Assume that H is the output of hash on input of a file F , and (Q , U) is a signature on F . According to the discriminant
X ≡ Y (%M), namely
(αQ−1)QUTαQ
n ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)USTβHQ
n−1+Hn(%M),
an adversary may seek the value of any signature variable by supposing the value of the other variable.
If we suppose the value of Q , no matter whether U exists or not, seeking U is equivalent to TLP.
Similarly, if we suppose the value of U , seeking Q is also equivalent to TLP.
① Faced with RFP and the tight constraint
If the adversary hits exactly the small đ , raises either side of the discriminant to the đ -th power, and assumes that
Ð | (δQ −WH) holds, then there is
(αQ−1)đQUT ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)đUST (%M).
Further, let
(αQ−1)đQT ≡ (G¯Q1 U−1)đ ST (%M). (6)
Now, suppose that Q is known, and U is unknown. If the congruence
Uđ T ≡ ((α−1Q )đQT )S−1 G¯Qđ T1 (%M)
has the trivial solution, work U out by Theorem 2; otherwise work U out by the index-calculus method. However, Q and U
must satisfy the constraintÐ | (δQ −WH). The probability of satisfaction is at most 1/Ð < 1/2n when δ andW are unknown.
Notice that successive values of Q cannot guarantee the integral succession of (δQ −WH), and (Q , U = ((α−1Q )Q )S−1 G¯Q
%M) does not satisfy the discriminant.
② Faced with PRFP
We observe that (αQ
n
β−(HQ n−1+Hn))đ ≡ 1 (%M), namely αQ nβ−(HQ n−1+Hn) is an element of the subgroup of order đ .
Assume that e¯ is a solution to xđ ≡ 1 (% M), and g is a generator of Z∗M . Evaluate u, v, q by the index-calculus method
such that gu ≡ α (%M), gv ≡ β (%M), and gq ≡ e¯ (%M) [25]. Then
guQ
n
g−v(HQ
n−1+Hn) ≡ gq(%M),
namely
uQ n − vHQ n−1 − vHn − q ≡ 0 (%M¯) (7)
which is a modular polynomial equation in Q .
If this polynomial equation has solutions, and Q can be figured out, U may be evaluated according to (6). In this way, Q
and U which likely meet the discriminant can be found.
Solving (7) forQ is of PRFP forwhich a generic subexponential algorithm is not found so far, and in terms of AGR [47], PRFP
is believed to be harder than RFP. Besides, because gcd(u, M¯) > 1 is fully possible, namely (7) is not necessarily a polynomial
of which the first term coefficient is 1, and there exists M¯1/n ∈ (2696/80, 21216/128) ≈ (28.7, 29.5), attack on (7) is ineffectual by
theCoppersmith reductionwhich can find sufficiently small solutions,whose absolute values are less than M¯1/n, to amodular
univariate polynomial [48] if such solutions exist. Again, if the adversary solves (7) through the probabilistic algorithm in
Section 1.6 of [44], the time complexity will be O(M¯/n) > O(2n).
③ Non-malicious subgroup of order đ .
We observe from (6) that if đ is guessed accurately, and gcd(U , M¯) = 1 holds, there is
((αQ−1)QT (G¯−Q1 U)
ST )đ ≡ 1, or ((αQ−1)Q (G¯−Q1 U)S)đ T ≡ 1 (%M),
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which implies that the element (αQ−1)QT (G¯−Q1 U)ST belongs to the subgroup of order đ . Therefore, if gather many enough
signatures (Q , U), all the elements of the subgroup are likely found out. However, the analysis in Section 6.2 shows that
even if this case occurs, it does not influence the security of a REESSE1+ signature.
Further, through gathering more enough signatures or following the index-calculus method, all the elements of the
subgroup of order đT are likely found out. They can be described with a general expression in the time LM [1/3, 1.923],
but picking out a specific element will take the time O(đT ) > O(2n) since we must try all the elements one by one.
6.3.3. Forging a signature from the signature algorithm is of TLP or PRFP
Owing to Q ≡ (RG0)Sδh¯ (%M), UT ≡ (RW k−δ)QT e¯ (%M), and V ≡ (R−1W δG1)QUδλ (%M) (see Section 3.4), an adversary
may attempt the following attack approach.
Let
Q ≡ aSδh¯(%M), UT ≡ bQT e¯(%M), V ≡ cQUδλ(%M),
where λmeets
λS ≡ ((WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS)(δQ − HW )(%M¯).
Correspondingly, there are ac ≡ (α δ−1 h¯−1)S−1 , and bc ≡ G¯1 (%M).
If e¯ is hit, (Q , U) is a known signature, and (UT e¯−1)M¯/(Tgcd(Q ,M¯)) ≡ 1 (%M) holds, a solution b to the equation bQT ≡ UT e¯−1
(%M) can be found through either the index-calculus method or the trivial root method. Further, c can be figured from
bc ≡ G¯1 (%M). However, it is impossible to find a from ac ≡ (α δ−1 h¯−1)S−1 (%M) since δ, h¯ cannot be obtained from Q , U ,
and V .
If δ, h¯ are found, then c , b can be evaluated on assuming a value of a. Further, if Ð is extracted from M¯ ,W is figured, and
r is guessed, the adversary may compute the values of Q and U which satisfy
Ð |(δQ −WH)(%M¯), and đ |((WQ )n−1 + ξ + rUS)(%M¯).
If δ,W can be found, h¯may possibly be computed according to α ≡ δh¯(W δG0G1)S (%M).
The above analysis shows that the acquiring δ andW is the key to the problem. To seek δ andW from a known clear clue,
the adversary has to try to solve the simultaneous equations
α ≡ δ(δn+δWn−1)T (%M)
β ≡ δWnT (%M).
Obviously, the first equation is computationally at least equivalent to TLP. The second equation contains two variables,
and belongs to the indeterminate problem. Raising either side of the first to theW -th power yields
αW ≡ δ(δnW+δWn)T ≡ δδnWTβδ(%M),
which is still very complicated, and the problem is not simplified.
Let g be a generator of the group (Z∗M , ·). By the index-calculus for discrete logarithms [25], evaluate u, v, and x such that
gu ≡ α, gv ≡ β , and gx ≡ δ (%M) (notice that the latter does not mean gx ≡ δ (%M¯)). Then, we have
u ≡ xT (δn + δW n−1)(%M¯)
v ≡ xTW n(%M¯).
If x is guessed, the two values of W may possibly be obtained according to the above two equations. Nevertheless the
two values ofW are not necessarily equal to each other, which indicates that the value of x is not right.
If the inverse ofW % M¯ exists, there is xT ≡ vW−n (%M¯). Hence, we have
u ≡ vW−n(δn + δW n−1)
≡ v((δW−1)n + δW−1)(%M¯).
≡ v(yn + y)(%M¯),
where y ≡ δW−1 (%M¯). Notice that y is of great value to the adversary if it can be found, for the adversary may obtain
Q ≡ y−1H (% M¯) as he lets δQ −WH ≡ 0 (% M¯) according to Ð | (δQ −WH).
The above congruence is of PRFP which is very intractable, and believed to be harder than RFP [47]. Additionally, because
gcd(v, M¯) > 1 is fully possible, and there exists M¯1/n ∈ (2696/80, 21216/128) ≈ (28.7, 29.5), an attack on the above congruence
is ineffectual by the Coppersmith reduction [48]. If you are afraid of the Coppersmith reduction, in practice, the exponent n
independent of the block length may be substituted with a larger integer.
If M¯ is factorized, Ð is obtained, and W−1 % Ð exists, and there is u ≡ v (yn + y) (%Ð), where Ð contains a prime not
less than 2n. When the Coppersmith reduction is useless, the adversary may attempt the exhaustive search. Nevertheless,
its running time is close to Ð ≥ 2n.
Again it is known from the key generation algorithm that there isW ≡ (ni=1 Ai)−1(α δ−1h−1)(Sδ)−1 (%M). However, such
a substitution of W will not make the simultaneous equations reduced since
n
i=1 Ai is unknown, and W (
n
i=1 Ai) is the
(S δ)−1-th power of the unknown quantity (α δ−1h−1).
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6.4. Forging a signature from known signatures with a public key is of TLP or hash−1
Given a file F and a signature (Q , U) on it, and assume that there exists another file F ′ with the related H ′ and G¯′1. If any
arbitrary (Q ′, U ′) satisfies
(αQ ′−1)Q
′U ′TαQ
′n ≡ (G¯′Q ′1 U ′−1)U
′STβH
′Q ′n−1+H ′n(%M),
it is a signature fraud on F ′.
Clearly, an adversary is allowed to utilize the known values of Q and U separately.
If let Q ′ = Q , Q ′ does not necessarily satisfy Ð | (δ Q ′ −WH ′), and computing U ′ is equivalent to TLP.
If we let U ′ = U , no matter whether the discriminant has solutions or not, seeking Q ′ is also equivalent to TLP.
If the two signatures (Q1,U1) and (Q2,U2) on the files F1 and F2 are obtained, due toÐ | (δQ1−WH1) andÐ | (δQ2−WH2),
we see that
Ð |(δ(Q1 + Q2)−W (H1 + H2)).
Let Q ′ = Q1 + Q2, H ′ = H1 + H2, then Ð| (δQ′ − WH ′). However, inferring F ′ from H ′ is intractable according to the
properties of hash functions. In addition, finding a fit U ′ from
U ′Tđ ≡ ((α−1Q ′)Q ′TS−1 G¯′Q ′T1 )đ (%M)
is also intractable since U ′ has Tđ values.
If many of the pairs (Q , U) are gathered, because Q is random, Q and U interrelate through a transcendental logarithm,
and the value of U varies intensely between 1 andM , there is no polynomial function or statistic regularity among different
(Q , U)′s, which indicates that they are unhelpful in solving TLP, but yet helpful in finding out the elements of the subgroup
of order đ or đT as is pointed out in Section 6.2.
Thus, forging a signature through known signatures with a public key is of TLP or the hash−1(H).
6.5. Adaptive-chosen-message attack is faced with indistinguishability
In accordancewith Section 3.4,Q satisfiesÐ | (δ Q−WH), namelyQ ≡ (a¯Ð−WH)δ−1 (%M¯), where a¯ is a random integer,
and meets (đT ) - a¯.
The randomness of a¯ leads Q to be random while U is interrelated with Q in a transcendental logarithm, where Q ≡
(RG0)S δh¯ (%M), and U ≡ (RW k−δ)Q δa¯Ðr (%M).
Hence, for the identical file F , there will be many different signatures on it, which manifests that the signature (Q , U)
owns indistinguishability.
In terms of [38], the signature (Q , U) on F is secure against adaptive-chosen-message attack.
6.6. Chosen-signature attack is faced with PRFP
It is well understood from the discriminant that
G¯
QUST
1 β
HQ n−1+Hn ≡ (αQ−1)QUTαQ nUUST (%M). (8)
If the values of Q and U are chosen in advance, an adversary may attempt to figure out H and the corresponding file or
message F .
Let G¯1 = f (H) =ni=1 Cbii %M , where H = b1 . . . bn =ni=1 bi2n−i, then (8) is an equation in b1, . . . , bn.
Furthermore, let g be a generator of (Z∗M , ·), and through the index-calculus method, work out q1, . . . , qn, v, u, w such
that
gq1 ≡ C1(%M), . . . , gqn ≡ Cn(%M), gv ≡ β(%M),
gu ≡ (αQ−1)QUTαQ nUUST (%M), w ≡ QUST (%M¯).
Then, there is
(q1b1 + · · · + qnbn)w + v

Q n−1
n
i=1
bi2n−i +

n
i=1
bi2n−i
n
≡ u(%M¯),
which is of the multivariate polynomial root finding problem (Multivariate PRFP). Clearly, even though H is found, it is
infeasible to infer a fit F from H .
On the other hand, if there exists the inverse function H = f −1(G¯1), namely H in (8) is substituted with G¯1, evaluating
G¯1 from (8) is the combination of RFP, DLP and PRFP.
7. Conclusion
REESSE1+ is only a prototypal cryptosystemwhich is used for explaining some concepts, ideas, andmethods, so the space
and time complexities of the five algorithms are not analyzed in the paper.
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A REESSE1+ private key contains 2n + 5 variables, but does not contain quadratic polynomials; thus REESSE1+ is a
multivariate cryptosystem different from TTM and TTS.
In REESSE1+, not only the numerical calculation ability but also the logic judgement ability of a computer is utilized; thus
the reversibility of the functions is relatively poor.
MPP which contains indeterminacy is a composite problem integrating IFP with DLP. ASPP is also a composite problem
integrating IFP, DLP with ASSP, where ASSP can resist the L3 lattice base reduction. TLP is a primitive problemwhich may be
regarded as consisting of two variables. PRFP is also a primitive problemwhich contains both addition and multiplication —
axn + bxn−1 + cx+ d ≡ 0 (%M¯)with n ≥ 80, a ≠ 0, 1, d ≠ 0, and |b| + |c| ≠ 0 for example. So far, a generic subexponential
algorithm for solvingMPP, ASPP, TLP, or PRFP is not found. Due to indeterminacy, even as lgM ≈ 80, solvingMPP, ASPP, TLP,
or PRFP for the original answer is infeasible in subexponential time yet. Notice that lgM ≈ 80 indicates that the constraint
M > (max1≤i≤n Ai)n is removed from the key generator, and REESSE1+ is only used for digital signature.
Some evidence given in the paper inclines people to believe that MPP, ASPP, and TLP are harder than DLP in the same
prime fieldGF(M) each, and the evidence given in [47] inclines people to believe that PRFP is harder than RFP, whichmakes
people interested in it whether or not there exists a polynomial time algorithm for solving MPP, ASPP, TLP, or PRFP in the
quantum computational model [21].
At present, the REESSE1+ cryptosystem is constructed in a prime field ZM , namely GF(M).
Suppose thatM is still a prime number. Then ZM is a finite field with general addition and multiplication, and ZM [x] is a
Euclidean domain over ZM , namely a principle ideal domain and a uniquely factorial domain [22]. Additionally, we suppose
that P(x) ∈ ZM [x] is an irreducible polynomial of which the coefficient of the first term is the integer 1. Then ZM [x]/P(x)
constitutes a polynomial ring including a congruent Abelian group. Therefore, it is feasible to transplant REESSE1+ to the
ring ZM [x]/ P(x) from the prime field ZM .
From the dialectical viewpoint, it is impossible that a public key cryptosystem possesses all the merits because some
merits are possibly restrained by others. Along with the development of CPU techniques and quantum computations, what
people are more concerned about are the securities of cryptosystems, but not the lengths of parameters.
Clearly, as viewed from utility, it should be researched further how to decrease the length of a REESSE1+ modulus and to
increase the speed of a REESSE1+ decryption.
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Appendix. Indeterminate encryption
Below, a small example is given.
This example is only used to explain how to encrypt a plaintext and decrypt a ciphertext through the algorithms in
Section 5.3.1, and thus the quantities h¯, S, α, β and some constraints are not considered.
Let n = 6 and = 19.
(1) Generation of a key pair
① Select đ =21, Ð =95, and T =143.
② Randomly generate a coprime sequence {Ai}= {17, 10, 13, 9, 19, 7}.
③ Find the primeM =174594421 such thatM > 196 and (đÐ T )| (M¯ = 174594420).
④ PickW =155629 and δ = 3761 making gcd(δ, M¯) = 1 and ∥δ∥ = đÐ T .
⑤ Randomly produce pairwise distinct {ℓ(i)}= {7, 15, 5, 11, 13, 9}.
⑥ Compute {Ci}= {116331875, 87811986, 61498911, 6213388, 8089113, 9766243} by Ci ← (AiW ℓ(i))δ %M .
Regard ({Ci}, M) as a public key, and ({Ai}, W , δ) as a private key. Discard the quantities đ , Ð, {ℓ(i)} which cannot be
divulged.
(2) Encryption
Assume that ({Ci},M) is a public key. Let b1 . . . b6 = 100110 be a plaintext.
① Obtain b1 . . . b6 = 100310, k = 1.
② Randomly generate s1 . . . s6 = 010001.
③Modify s5 and b5 by s5 ← 1 and b5 ← b5 + k = 2.
④ Compute G¯ ≡ (C1×0+(1−1+1)¬0)1(C2×1+(2−0+1)¬1)0(C3×0+(3−0+1)¬0)0(C4×0+(4−3+1)¬0)3
(C5×1+(5−2+1)¬1)2(C6×1+(6−0+1)¬1)0 ≡ C11C32 C25 ≡ 116331875× 156599315× 124996494
≡ 75924783(%M) by G¯ ≡ni=1(Cisi+(i−bi+1)¬si)bi (%M)with Cn+1 =1.
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So, the ciphertext G¯ =75924783 is obtained. Notice that because s1 . . . s6 is randomly generated, on inputting the
identical plaintext 100110 many times, we will obtain many distinct ciphertexts.
(3) Decryption
Assume that ({17, 10, 13, 9, 19, 7}, 155629, 3761) is a related private key.
Let G¯ =75924783 be a ciphertext.
① Compute G¯ ≡ G¯δ−1 ≡ 759247833761−1 ≡ 759247834781501 ≡ 165482231 (%M).
ComputeW−2 ≡ (W−1)2 ≡ (1171225)2 ≡ 154229249 (%M).
Outer loop 1:
② Compute G¯ ≡ 165482231× 154229249≡ 144398410 (%M) by G¯← G¯W−2 %M .
③ Set b1 . . . b6 = 0 . . . 0, e¨ = 0, j = 0, k = 0,G = G¯ = 144398410, i = 1.
Inner loop 1:
④ Due to (Ae¨+11 = 171) - (G = 144398410), the next.
⑤ Due to e¨ = 0,
let k = 0+ 1 = 1, i = 1+ 1 = 2.
⑥ Due to i = 2 ≤ 6 and G ≠ 1, go to ④.
Inner loop 2:
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =101)| (G = 144398410), e¨ = 0+ 1 = 1, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =102) - (G =144398410), the next.
⑤ Due to e¨ = 1 ≠ 0,
compute G =144398410/A12 =14439841;
owing to k =1> 0, let b2 =1;
owing to k =1 ≠ 0, let i = 2+ 1 = 3;
owing k+ 1 = 2 > e¨ = 1, let i = 6+ 1 = 7;
set e¨ = 0, k =0.
⑥ Due to i =7> 6, the next.
⑦ Due to G =14439841 ≠ 1, go to ②.
Outer loop 2:
...
...
Outer loop 39:
② Compute G¯ ≡ 131367179× 154229249≡ 6137000 (%M) by G¯← G¯W−2 %M .
③ Set b1 . . . b6 = 0 . . . 0, e¨ = 0, j =0, k =0, G = G¯ = 6137000, i =1.
Inner loop 1:
④ Due to (Ae¨+11 =171)| (G = 6137000), e¨ = 0+ 1 = 1, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+11 =172) - (G = 6137000), the next.
⑤ Due to e¨ = 1 ≠ 0,
compute G =6137000/A11 = 361000;
owing to k = 0 and i+ e¨− 1 < 6, let bi+e¨−1 = b1 =1;
owing to k = 0, let i = 1+ e¨ = 1+ 1 = 2;
owing to k+ 1 = 1 = e¨, the next;
set e¨ = 0, k = 0.
⑥ Due to i = 2 ≤ 6 and G ≠ 1, go to ④.
Inner loop 2:
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =101)| (G = 361000), e¨ = 0+ 1 = 1, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =102)| (G = 361000), e¨ = 1+ 1 = 2, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =103)| (G = 361000), e¨ = 2+ 1 = 3, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+12 =104) - (G = 361000), the next.
⑤ Due to e¨ = 3 ≠ 0,
compute G = 361000/A32 = 361;
owing to k = 0 and i+ e¨− 1 < 6, let bi+e¨−1 = b4 =1;
owing to k = 0, let i = 2+ e¨ = 2+ 3 = 5;
owing to k+ 1 = 1 < e¨ = 3, the next;
set e¨ = 0, k = 0.
⑥ Due to i = 5 ≤ 6 and G ≠ 1, go to ④.
Inner loop 3:
④ Due to (Ae¨+15 =191) | (G =361), e¨ = 0+ 1 = 1, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+15 =192) | (G =361), e¨ = 1+ 1 = 2, go to ④.
④ Due to (Ae¨+15 =193) - (G =361), the next.
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⑤ Due to e¨ = 2 ≠ 0,
compute G =361/A25 =1;
owing to i+ e¨− 1 = 5+ 2− 1 = 6, let bi = b5 =1;
owing to k = 0, let i = 5+ 2 = 7;
owing to k+ 1 = 1 < e¨ = 2, the next;
⑥ Due to i = 7 > 6 or G =1, the next.
⑦ Due G = 1, end.
In this way, we recover the original plaintext b1 . . . b6 = 100110.
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